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WHEN THE POLICE ARE IN OUR
BEDROOMS, SHOULDN'T THE COURTS GO
IN AFTER THEM?: AN UPDATE ON THE
FIGHT AGAINST "SODOMY" LAWS
by Evan Wolfson and Robert S. Mower*
So-called "sodomy" laws - criminal sanctions on consensual
oral or anal sex even in private - remain in force in nearly half the
states. Far from being mere curios of a distant past, they continue
to brand a stamp of second-class citizenship on gay men and lesbi-
ans, stigmatize our identity and our sexual conduct, and sanction
many forms of discrimination against us. Although most "sodomy"
laws on their face apply to both non-gay and gay adults engaging in
entirely common sexual activity, it is gay people who are their prin-
cipal direct victims.1 By their very existence, these statutes hang as
an ominous Sword of Damocles over the heads of lesbians and gay
men throughout the country.
The brief, filed by Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund
as amici curiae in Louisiana v. Baxley2 and reprinted below demon-
strates how deleterious "sodomy" or "crime against nature" stat-
utes are in the real everyday lives of millions of Americans. The
Brief also argues that because the present purpose of these laws is
to stigmatize gay people, because such laws deprive us of personal
liberty, and because the laws are understood to outlaw our expres-
sions of love, gay men and lesbians have "standing" to challenge
the constitutionality of these laws.
* Evan Wolfson is Senior Staff Attorney at Lambda Legal Defense and Educa-
tion Fund, the nation's oldest and largest lesbian and gay legal rights organization,
and is an adjunct professor of law at Columbia University School of Law. Robert S.
Mower is a cooperating attorney with Lambda, and along with Evan Wolfson and
New Orleans attorney R. James Kellogg, co-wrote the amicus curiae brief presented
below. The authors would like to thank Lambda law intern Richard Ante for his
assistance on this introductory essay.
1. On another, less direct level, "sodomy" laws also wreak harm by perpetuating
sexism, as well as heterosexism. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Note, The Miscegena-
tion Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145, 147 (1988) (the
"function [of these laws] is to maintain the polarities of gender on which the subordi-
nation of women depends").
2. 633 So. 2d 142 (La. 1994).
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"Sodomy" laws are used as weapons to deny gay men and lesbi-
ans a multitude of rights and benefits. They are often invoked as
the basis for hostile legal action, whether it be in the debate over
the military's anti-gay policy,4 employment,5 parental custody and
visitation,6 or association.7 Furthermore, "sodomy" laws incite vio-
lence against lesbians and gay men,8 and restrict opportunities for
interaction between gay and non-gay people, thereby perpetuating
prejudice.9 Many of the harmful effects of "sodomy" laws fall
3. Brief at 16-28; see also, e.g., Mary C. Dunlap, Gay Men and Lesbians Down By
Law in the 1990's USA: The Continuing Toll of Bowers v. Hardwick, 24 GOLDEN
GATE U. L.REv. 1, 12-16 (1994).
4. See Brief at 16-18. See also Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) (osten-
sibly criminalizing oral or anal sex by anyone); Department of Defense Directive
(DoDD) 1304.26 (open gay identity will continue to be a basis for barring entry into
the Armed Forces); DoDD 1332.14 and DoDD 1332.30 (even private sex between
people of the same sex is a basis for separation); Department of Defense Instruction
(DoDI) 5505.8 (in investigations of sexual misconduct by defense criminal investiga-
tive organizations, sexual misconduct is defined as a sexual act in violation of the
UCMJ that occurs between consenting adults in private). Although most of the rules
on sexual activity purport to apply to heterosexual' as well as same-sex sex, no regi-
men of discriminatory exclusion or presumptions against non-gay personnel has been
based on these rules. See, e.g., Francisco Valdes, Sexual Minorities in the Military:
Charting the Constitutional Frontiers of Status and Conduct, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV.
381 (1994).
5. Brief at 18-20, 22-23. See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 668 (N.D. Ga. 1992), partial summ. judgment denied, summ. judgment granted,
dismissed, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 109 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (attorney fired from
State Attorney General's office because of her religious marriage to another woman;
"sodomy" law cited as basis for dismissal); see also City of Dallas v. England, 846
S.W.2d 957 (Tex. App. 1993), writ dismissed w.o.j. (May 5, 1993), reh'g. of writ of error
overruled (June 9, 1993), and Woodard v. Gallagher, No. 89-5776 (Orange Cty. Fla.
Cir. Ct. June 9, 1992), involving, respectively, a Texas lesbian and a Florida gay man
denied work in law enforcement because of anti-gay hiring policies ostensibly based
on "sodomy" laws.
6. Brief at 21. See Bottoms v. Bottoms, No. CH93JA0517-00, (Va. Cir. Ct. Hen-
rico County Sept. 7, 1993) (custody of child granted to non-parent because lesbian
mother's private sexual activity violates state "sodomy" law), rev'd, Bottoms v. Bot-
toms, 444 S.E.2d 276, 281 (Va. App., 1994) (being lesbian or gay and sexually active
does not per se render a parent unfit to have custody of his or her child, discussed,
infra, at 1010).
7. Brief at 21. See, e.g., Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 558 F.2d 848, 850 (8th Cir.
1977) (reversing district court, which ruled that school officials were justified in refus-
ing to recognize organization on the ground that recognition would probably result in
the commission of felonious acts of "sodomy"); Gay Students Organization v. Bon-
ner, 509 F.2d 652, 662-63 (1st Cir. 1974) (university unsuccessfully asserts interest in
"preventing illegal activity," which may include "deviate" sex acts or "lascivious car-
riage" as basis for ban on student group); Gay Activists Alliance v. Board of Regents,
638 P.2d 1116, 1121-22 (Ok. 1981) (refusal by regents to recognize gay student organi-
zation because of mere existence of Oklahoma law against oral or anal sex).
8. Brief 25-26; see also Dunlap, supra note 5 at 12-16.
9. Brief at 26-27.
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harshest on lesbian and gay youth.10 Finally, these laws intrude
upon the sexual activity, private choices, and intimate association
rights of gay and non-gay adults, where the State has no legitimate
business, and thus injure and diminish all Americans." The United
States Supreme Court turned a "willful[y] blind[ ]" eye to the
harms such statutes impose on all Americans in general, and on
gay and lesbian people in particular.' 2 Bowers v. Hardwick upheld
Georgia's "sodomy" statute against a federal constitutional chal-
lenge brought by a man arrested and kept overnight in jail for the
"crime" of oral sex with another adult in his own bedroom. 13
Invoking the purported "ancient roots" of anti-gay sentiment,' 4
the Court declared that there is no "fundamental right to engage in
homosexual sodomy" implicit in the Constitution; its framing of the
question tellingly ignored the fact that at issue in the case was
Georgia's prohibition on oral and anal intercourse between anyone,
whether gay or non-gay, married or unmarried, male or female. 15
10. See, e.g., Gibson, Gay Male and Lesbian Youth Suicide, in REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE ON YOUTH SUICIDE, U. S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVICES 3-110, 3-117 (1989) (discussing connections between anti-gay discrimination
in society and distress and violence experienced by many young gay people);
Remafedi, Farrow & Deisher, Risk Factors for Attempted Suicide in Gay and Bisexual
Youth, 87 PEDIATRICS 869, 873 (1991) (suicide by lesbian and gay youth); see also
Cook, Who is Killing Whom? at 1 (Respect All Youth Project of Fed'n of Parents &
Friends of Lesbians & Gays, Issue Paper 1, 1991)(gay youth internalize negative social
messages about gay people); Hetrick & Martin, Developmental Issues and Their Res-
olution for Gay and Lesbian Adolescents, 14 J. OF HOMOSEXUALITY 25, 29 (1987)(gay
youth "often demonstrate an appalling ignorance of what it means to be homosexual,
reflecting the basest stereotypes about homosexual people and therefore about them-
selves"); Gonsiorek, Mental Health Issues of Gay and Lesbian Adolescents, 9 J. ADO-
LESCENT HEALTH CARE 114, 117-19 (1988)(gay youth's consequent sense of social
isolation and moral worthlessness); Martin, Learning to Hide: The Socialization of the
Gay Adolescent, 10 ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY: DEVELOPMENTAL AND CLINICAL
STUDIES 52, 58-59 (S. Feinstein ed. 1982).
11. Brief at 30.
12. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986)(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 191; see also Michael Hardwick, What Are You Doing in My Bedroom, in
PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVICTIONS: SIXTEEN AMERICANS WHO
FOUGHT THEIR WAY TO THE SUPREME COURT 392-403 (1988).
14. The Court's assertion that a history of hatred and past discrimination justifies
continued discrimination and official hatred in the future turns constitutional jurispru-
dence on its head. Even on its own terms, however, the Court was wrong in its discus-
sion of the history of "sodomy" laws and same-sex affection and sexual activity. See
Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531 (1992); see also
JOHN BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY (1980)
(documenting non-linear shifts in attitudes toward same-sex relationships throughout
Western history); BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PREMODERN EUROPE (1994)
(same).
15. Id. at 191-92 (emphasis added). The majority's recasting of a law against oral
or anal sex by anyone into a law against "homosexual sodomy" was a revealing exam-
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By so disingenuously construing the constitutional issue before it,
the Court failed to address the broader question of the right to be
free of government intrusion into choices regarding sexual intimacy
between consenting adults. 16 Although former Justice Lewis F.
Powell has since repudiated his "mistake[n]" "swing vote" that
made up the five-to-four majority, Hardwick casts a looming
shadow, an excuse for judges who do not wish to protect gay peo-
ple against official discrimination. 7
The anti-gay impetus of Hardwick was further highlighted just a
few weeks later when the Supreme Court refused to grant certio-
rari in an Oklahoma case holding that that state's gender-neutral
"sodomy" law could not constitutionally be enforced against differ-
ent-sex partners.'8  The Oklahoma decision and the Supreme
Court's silence suggested that Hardwick somehow drew a constitu-
tionally tolerable line between the rights of gay people and those of
non-gay people, even under a law that on its face ostensibly ap-
plied to both conduct by different-sex and same-sex partners.
By contrast, the Supreme Court of Maryland just two years later
rejected that proposition, holding rather that under Supreme Court
right-to-privacy precedents, the operative line between protected
and unprotected conduct is not between gay and non-gay people,
or same-sex and different-sex partners, but rather between married
and unmarried adults.' 9 Thus, the Maryland high court concluded,
under Hardwick, unmarried gay and non-gay adults alike can be
prosecuted for private consensual sex.
pie of the true evil these laws do today. Id. at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("the
Court's almost obsessive focus on homosexual activity is particularly hard to justify in
light of the broad language Georgia has used"). See Evan Wolfson, Civil Rights,
Human Rights, Gay Rights: Minorities and the Humanity of the Different, 14 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 21, 34 n.59 (1991). It is also an example of what Wolfson calls "the
Tom Lehrer principle," in honor of the comedian who declared "Life is like a sewer;
what you get out of it depends on what you put into it." Tom Lehrer, An Evening
Wasted With Tom Lehrer, (record) (1959).
16. Id. at 200-203 (Blackmun dissenting).
17. Hardwick, a privacy decision, was taken up as an all-purpose anti-gay weapon
by some judges, notably Reagan-Bush appointees to the federal appellate bench, who
reversed well-reasoned lower court decisions even when based on equal protection
and other constitutional claims. See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Secur-
ity Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir.
1990); Ben Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1296
(1990).
18. Post v. Oklahoma, 715 P.2d 1105 (Okla. Crim App. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 890 (1980).
19. State v. Schochet, 75 Md. App. 314, 541 A.2d 183 (1988) (under Supreme
Court precedents, including Hardwick, right to privacy does not protect sexual activity
of consenting adults outside of marriage).
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Although it reached the wrong result in protecting no one rather
than protecting all, the Maryland Supreme Court at least was more
faithful to the Constitution than either the U.S. or Oklahoma
courts in its refusal to create different classes of citizenship along
sexual orientation lines. Such an approach, as Justice Stevens
wrote in his Hardwick dissent, is "plainly unacceptable."20 Justice
Stevens declared:
Although the meaning of the principle that "all men are created
equal" is not always clear, it surely must mean that every free
citizen has the same interest in "liberty" that the members of the
majority share. From the standpoint of the individual, the ho-
mosexual and the heterosexual have the same interest in decid-
ing how he will live his own life, and, more narrowly, how he
will conduct himself in his personal and voluntary associations
with his companions. State intrusion into the private conduct of
either is equally burdensome.2'
Despite its glaring defects and offensiveness, Hardwick continues
to distort the law of privacy and individual freedom, as well as the
equality and personal rights of gay men and lesbians.
In the wake of Hardwick and its progeny, those of us seeking to
challenge the constitutionality of "sodomy" statutes have, of neces-
sity, turned to state courts and state constitutions to secure the pro-
tection of private sexual intimacy denied by federal courts. In
some states, such as Pennsylvania 22 and New York,23 the judiciary
has been remarkably receptive to such challenges. Courts there
have recognized that their own state constitutions can and do offer
greater protection for individual liberties than the federal constitu-
tion. Indeed, until recently, we were on a roll, with powerful deci-
sions from the Supreme Court of Kentucky,24 lower courts in
Texas,25 Louisiana,26 and Michigan,27 and legislatures in Nevada28
20. 478 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 218-19.
22. Pennsylvania v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980).
23. New York v. Onofre, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 51 N.Y.2d 476 (1980), cert. denied 451
U.S. 987 (1981).
24. Kentucky v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
25. City of Dallas v. England, 846 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993); Texas v.
Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992);
26. State v. Baxley, No. 356-945, Section E (Crim. Dist. Ct. 1993).
27. Michigan Organization for Human Rights ("MOHR") v. Kelley, No. 88-
815820 CZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 9, 1990). MOHR was adjudicated in Wayne County,
sitting at Detroit, with the State Attorney General, in his official capacity, as the de-
fendant. The court struck down the "sodomy" and "gross indecency" statutes as un-
constitutional when applied to private, consensual oral and anal sex between adults.
The attorney general chose not to appeal and is therefore bound by this decision not
19941 1001
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
and the District of Columbia2 9 all striking down their respective
"sodomy" statutes.
Unfortunately, aberrant decisions from the Louisiana and Texas
supreme courts this year brought about a departure from the re-
cent willingness of courts to tackle the harms caused by even the
mere existence of "sodomy" laws.3" In Louisiana v. Baxley and
Texas v. Morales, two state high courts chose to avoid reaching the
important constitutional and social issues presented in challenges
to "sodomy" statutes by focusing instead on "standing" and juris-
dictional arguments. 31
Louisiana v. Baxley involved a state constitutional challenge by a
gay man, charged with a criminal violation of Louisiana's "crime
against nature" statute.32 Johnny Baxley was arrested for proposi-
tioning an undercover officer in the New Orleans French Quarter
and allegedly offering to pay him twenty dollars for oral sex.33
Baxley admitted discussing consensual fellatio but denied ever hav-
ing offered money.34
The Louisiana "sodomy" statute provides, in part:
A. Crime against nature is:
to prosecute private, consensual "sodomy" between adults. Furthermore, because
the Attorney General has supervisory powers over all prosecuting attorneys in the
State, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 14.30 (West 1994) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 3.183 (Cal-
laghan 1985)); In re Watson, 293 Mich. 263, 270 (1940), the attorney general should
be obliged to direct all prosecutors not to prosecute the "sodomy" and "gross inde-
cency" statutes where the sexual conduct is private, consensual, and between adults.
In theory, then, MOHR ended such prosecutions of gay men and lesbians in Michi-
gan. There is, however, some question regarding the precedential value of MOHR v.
Kelley. The opinion, being one issued by a trial court, is not published in any reporter
or available electronically. Annotated statutory compilations also make no mention
of it. Because of this, and in the absence of further action by the courts, many will
more likely conclude that Michigan's "sodomy" law may still be enforced against pri-
vate, consensual "sodomy" between adults. MOHR illustrates once again the diffi-
culty at getting at these statutes, which serve the State's purpose whether or not
actually "enforced."
28. In 1993, the "sodomy" law was amended, substituting "anal intercourse, cunni-
lingus, or fellatio in public" for "the infamous 'crime against nature.' " NEV. REV.
STAT. § 201.190 (1993) (emphasis added). A second amendment deleted former sub-
section 2, which read "the infamous 'crime against nature' means anal intercourse,
cunnilingus, or fellatio between consenting adults of the same sex." NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 201.193 (1993) (repealed "Crime Against Nature: Sexual Penetration" statute). See
1993 STATUTES OF NEVADA 236 at 518.
29. D.C. Act 10-23 (D.C. CODE SUPP. 1994).
30. Louisiana v. Baxley, 633 So. 2d at 144; Texas v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941, 944
(Tex. 1994).
31. Baxley, 633 So. 2d at 144; Morales, 869 S.W.2d at 942.
32. 633 So. 2d at 143.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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(1) The unnatural carnal copulation by a human being with
another of the same sex or opposite sex or with an animal....
Emission is not necessary; and, when committed by a human be-
ing with another, the use of the genital organ of one of the of-
fenders of whatever sex is sufficient to constitute the crime.
(2) The solicitation by a human being of another with the in-
tent to engage in any unnatural carnal copulation for
compensation.
B. Whoever violates the provisions of this Section shall be fined
not more than two thousand dollars, or imprisoned, with or
without hard labor, for not more than five years, or both.35
Louisiana thus criminalizes two kinds of so-called "crime against
nature" provisions: commercial and non-commercial consensual
oral or anal sex by anyone. Upon arrest, Baxley was charged gen-
erally with both.36
Baxley and his defense attorney, John Rawls, of New Orleans,
seized the opportunity presented by his arrest to challenge the con-
stitutionality of the entire "sodomy" law. 7 In order to do so,
Baxley had to hurdle the question of "standing". In Louisiana, "a
party does not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a
statute unless the application of that statute adversely affects
him."' 38 Baxley argued that he had "standing" because he was
charged with violating La. Rev. Stat. § 14:89(A) in its entirety, a
five-year felony that placed his personal liberty in jeopardy.39
The State's attorneys claimed that Baxley lacked "standing" be-
cause the "commercial" nature of his alleged crime put him solely
under the purview of § 14:89(A)(2).40 To assert that he could ad-
dress subpart (A)(2) alone, the State argued that the statute's two
clauses were independent and could be severed, despite having
charged him with both.
The trial court granted Baxley "standing" to challenge the entire
law, deciding that because the constitutionality of one part impli-
cated the other, the statute was not severable.4 1 It held that sub-
part (A)(2), which prohibits solicitation of compensated "un-
natural carnal copulation," must be considered with subpart
35. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:89 (1994).
36. Brief at 6.
37. Baxley, 633 So. 2d at 143-44.
38. Louisiana v. Brown, 389 So. 2d 48, 50 (La. 1980).
39. Baxley, 633 So.2d at 144.
40. Id. at 143.
41. Id.
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(A)(1), which simply prohibits "unnatural carnal copulation. 4 2 If
one subpart were unconstitutional, so must the other.43 The trial
court then held that the statute unconstitutionally infringed upon
the choice of an adult to engage in consensual, private anal or oral
sex with another adult and, thus, violated the protected right to
privacy explicitly recognized by Article I, Section 5 of the Louisi-
ana Constitution."
The State Supreme Court reversed, agreeing with the State that
Baxley had standing to challenge § 14:89(A)(2) alone.45 The State
did not seek to defend the validity of prosecuting Baxley for non-
commercial sex; it argued that he was not subject to the law and
thus should not be able to challenge that prosecutorial option
(even though a jury could have found that he did not offer to pay,
but did offer to engage in oral sex, and thus was liable for attempt-
ing the "lesser included offense" of non-commercial "crime against
nature").
Ignoring the actual charges brought in the case, the Court al-
lowed the State to prosecute Baxley on the "commercial" charges
alone.46 Through this maneuver, the Court evaded the issue of
whether § 14:89(A)(1) violated the state constitutional right to
privacy.47
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Baxley, 633 So. 2d at 143
45. Id. at 146. Baxley never contested the State's ability to regulate commercial
sex, asserting instead that the police officer had fabricated the claim about compensa-
tion, a routine occurrence. He also challenged as constitutionally defective the incor-
poration of "unnatural carnal copulation" into the commercial provision,
§ 14:89(A)(2), a claim the Court elided.
46. Id. at 146.
47. Id. Both concurrences agreed with the majority that the legislature's proscrip-
tion of commercial "sodomy" is not unconstitutional. Baxley, 633 So. 2d at 147 (Or-
tique, J., concurring), 146 (Calogero, C. J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). One
justice also agreed with the majority that, facing a charge under subpart (A)(2),
Baxley lacked standing to challenge subpart (A)(1). Id. at 147 (Ortique, J., concur-
ring). However, Justice Ortique went on to say that:
Revamping of this antiquated statute is long overdue. Morality statutes
should reflect the moral standards of the era and not those of the turn of the
previous century. While the state has a legitimate interest in proscribing bes-
tiality and even the public solicitation of oral sex for compensation, in my
view it does not have a legitimate public policy interest in regulating the
non-commercial, consensual private acts of oral sex between consenting
adult human beings.
Id. The other dissenter argued that Baxley should have "standing" to challenge part
(A)(1) of the "sodomy" law because he was also at risk of being found guilty of con-
duct prohibited by that part of the statute. Id. at 146 (Calogero, C. J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part). Because "few areas of personal autonomy are more private
1004
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Baxley also contended that he was subject to conviction for
crime against nature under § 14:89(A)(1) as a responsive verdict to
a charge under § 14:89(A)(2), if the jury were to find that he
merely discussed uncompensated oral sex with the undercover of-
ficer.48 The trial court had earlier seen that Baxley could indeed be
convicted of attempted "crime against nature" on the facts
presented.4 9 The high court, however, chose to ignore this, saying
that "mere discussion or solicitation without a financial aspect can-
not constitute an attempt to engage in conduct prohibited by
§ 14:89(A)(1). '' 50 The Court declared that solicitation of another
to commit a crime is only "preparatory to the crime and not an
overt act" supporting conviction." Since Baxley was accused of
no "overt act" (beyond the alleged offer of money, for these pur-
poses discounted by the Court), the Court said he lacked standing
to challenge subpart (A) (1). Although the Court's manuevering
left the "sodomy" law intact, it was forced at least to clarify that
merely propositioning someone for oral sex is not a violation of the
"sodomy" law. 2
Baxley's counsel anticipated that the State and the Court might
try to avoid addressing the law on its merits by focusing on "stand-
ing." After all, as the Lambda Brief demonstrated, the State's
"'purpose" in such "sodomy" laws is not really to consummate any
particular conviction, nor to herd people wholesale out of their
bedrooms in handcuffs (especially since the law technically pun-
ishes acts commonly enjoyed by both gay and non-gay people
alike).5 3 Rather the primary purpose and effect of the laws today is
than sexual intimacy between consenting adults," Chief Justice Calogero, too, con-
cluded that the "sodomy" statute "invades the area of protected privacy recognized
by [the state constitution];" since "no compelling interests [to justify such an invasion]
have been urged, much less shown by the state in this case," the statute should be
struck down as unconstitutional. Id. at 147.
48. Id. at 144; Brief at 6-7.
49. 633 So. 2d at 147.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. One distinguished commentator has observed:
This decision stands the normal course of homosexual law reform on its
head. Usually, the first step is to get the sodomy law repealed, and then to
get the public solicitation law repealed or invalidated. (The Model Penal
Code, for example, recommended decriminalizing consensual sodomy but
retaining a ban on public solicitation for "deviate sexual intercourse.")
Arthur S. Leonard, "Louisiana Supreme Court: Plaintiff Lacks Standing in Sodomy
Challenge, But Solicitation For Private Gay Sex is Lawful," LESBIAN/GAY LAW
NOTES, p. 1 (April 1994).
53. For example, in Bowers v. Hardwick, the State had declined to prosecute
Michael Hardwick after holding him overnight in jail, even though he was arrested in
1994] 1005
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to stigmatize and punish gay people as a class, whether or not they
actually have engaged in sex.
Thus, the Brief presented several alternative bases for granting
Baxley "standing" to assert both privacy-based and equal protec-
tion claims. Among these was evidence that, Baxley and gay peo-
ple suffer actual and serious legal, social, and psychological harms
from the mere existence of the Louisiana "sodomy" statute,
whether or not they are arrested and prosecuted.
The Louisiana Supreme Court ignored these harms and failed to
even address them in its opinion. 54 By confining itself to "stand-
ing" and a dexterous severing of the statute far beyond the State's
own approach, the Court skirted any discussion of the constitu-
tional issues involved and successfully preserved the"sodomy" law
on the books. Even its declaration that a mere proposition does
not constitute a sufficient "overt act" ignored the reality that police
officers often misrepresent the facts of their enticement rackets, in
which they frequently invite propositions, then fabricate critical de-
tails, including offers of compensation.
The Louisiana Supreme Court was not alone in evading the ata-
vistic social injustice of "sodomy" law enforcement. The Supreme
Court of Texas did likewise just a couple of months earlier, in Texas
v. Morales.56 Morales was a civil proceeding brought by five gay
plaintiffs challenging the state "sodomy" law, Tex. Penal Code
§ 21.06, which explicitly criminalized so-called "homosexual con-
duct" only.57 The trial court, affirmed by the court of appeals, had
recognized the many different ways in which "sodomy" statutes are
used as weapons against gay people.58 Accordingly, those courts
granted the plaintiffs "standing" to assert their constitutional
his bedroom with a police officer as an eyewitness to the "crime," and was willing to
acknowledge that he had engaged in oral sex and would do so again. Likewise, in
Morales, the State actually defended maintaining the prohibition on gay people's pri-
vate consensual oral or anal sex by asserting that the statute "has not been, and in all
probability, will not be, enforced." 869 S.W.2d at 941. Nevertheless, the courts re-
fused to strike down the laws, leaving intact their threat and their stigma.
54. 633 So. 2d at 144-45.
55. See ROTELLO & WOLFSON, FIGHTING BACK: REST STOP ARRESTS, POLICE
ABUSE, AND THE GAY AND LESBIAN COMMUNITY (Lambda publication) (1992); Ni-
sonoff & Wolfson, The Defense of Consensual Sodomy, Public Lewdness, and Related
Criminal Cases, in THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF SEX OFFENSES, p. 7-1 (Mat-
thew Bender 1991).
56. 869 S.W.2d at 943.
57. Texas was one of a number of states that eliminated its general proscription on
oral or anal sex, and replaced it with a statute explicitly targeting gay people and
same-sex sexual activity. See Hunter, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. at 538-39.
58. 869 S.W.2d at 942. Texas v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201, 202 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
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claims based on the fact that they had "shown that the statute
causes actual harm which goes far beyond the mere threat of prose-
cution," even though none of the plaintiffs had been arrested under
the statute.5 9 The lower courts declared the'statute an unconstitu-
tional infringement on the right to privacy. 60
On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court proved disappointingly re-
luctant to discuss the merits of the constitutional challenge to the
"sodomy" law or, in an election year, to take heat for protecting
the equality and rights of gay people.61 It reversed the lower court
decision, implausibly maintaining that it lacked jurisdiction under
the state's "bifurcated system of civil and criminal jurisdiction" to
declare the criminal statute unconstitutional, absent some "irrepa-
rable injury to property rights" occasioned by the enforcement of
the statute.62 The dissent lambasted the majority's "shirking [of] its
equitable duty to provide a remedy for a wrong [by allowing] the
State to insulate its laws from judicial scrutiny. '63
Underlying the court's contortion, perhaps, was its knowledge
that it could have its cake and eat it, too. It refused to strike down
the law in Morales, but explicitly left standing Lambda's successful
challenge to the same "sodomy" law in City of Dallas v. England,64
in which the statute had been expressly used as a basis for denying
a lesbian applicant employment as a police officer.
In England, the plaintiff challenged the anti-gay hiring policy of
the Dallas police department, an administrative rule implementing
a criminal statute, the "sodomy" law.65 In order to determine the
validity of the hiring policy, the Texas Court of Appeals had to
consider the constitutionality of the "sodomy" statute on which the
policy was based.66 It held that both statute and policy were
unconstitutional. 67
This judgment in England is now final notwithstanding Morales,
which after all was simply the dismissal of a particular challenge to
the "sodomy" law for lack of jurisdiction, not a ruling on the mer-
59. Morales, 826 S.W.2d at 202.
60. Id. at 204-205.
61. "Three of the five justices in the majority are up for reelection this year."
Arthur S. Leonard, Cowardly Texas High Court Blows Off Sodomy Challenge, LES-
BIAN/GAY LAW NOTES, p. 13 (February 1994).
62. 869 S.W.2d at 942, 944.
63. Id. at 954.
64. 846 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. App. 1993), writ dismissed w.o.j. (May 5, 1993), reh'g of
writ of error overruled (June 9, 1993).
65. Id. at 957.
66. Id. at 959.
67. Id.
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its. In Texas, in order for a judgment to be subject to collateral
attack as void, it must carry evidence of its invalidity on its face.68
As the Morales Court itself explicitly noted in its "duck-and-cover"
ruling, unlike Morales, England did not present a naked challenge
to the "sodomy" statute. 69 Rather, England's challenge to § 21.06
and the Dallas hiring policy implementing it fell squarely within the
exception noted by the Texas Supreme Court in Morales for chal-
lenges to statutes "unconstitutionally applied by a rule, policy or
other noncriminal means subject to a civil court's equity powers."7
Thus, far from undermining the validity of the England judgment,
the Morales opinion made clear that the Court of Appeals properly
exercised its jurisdiction in that case.71
Furthermore, since Morales explicitly did not overturn it, the
England decision striking down the "sodomy" statute as unconsti-
tutional remains binding on all courts throughout Texas unless and
until the Texas Supreme Court decides otherwise.72 Indeed, be-
cause the State's petition for a writ of error was refused outright by
the Supreme Court in England, the court of civil appeals opinion
must be accorded "substantially equal dignity" to a decision of the
Supreme Court.73 Small thanks to the State Supreme Court, then,
the Texas "sodomy" law is off the books. Only the harms that had
been identified by the lower court in Morales remain unrecognized
by the high court.
Despite these unhappy aberrations, the battle against "sodomy"
laws continues, and there is hope again in Louisiana. In the wake
of Baxley, a trial court in New Orleans recently granted "standing"
to gay persons, including Johnny Baxley and his attorney, John
68. South Surety Co. v. Texas Oil Clearing House, 281 S.W. 1045, 1046 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1926, judgment adopted); City of Lufkin v. McVicker, 510 S.W.2d 141,
144 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
69. Id. at 942 n.5 (distinguishing England with its "concrete injury" from mere
declaratory actions).
70. Id. at 942.
71. See also Passel v. Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist., 440 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. 1969),
where plaintiff, like England, challenged an administrative rule implementing a crimi-
nal statute. As the dissent in Morales noted, Passel made clear that in order for the
court to determine the validity of a hiring policy, it must examine the constitutionality
of the criminal statute it implements. 869 S.W.2d at 951-53 (Gammage, J., dissenting).
Although Morales shows the lengths courts will go to avoid handing down a pro-gay
decision, the Texas Supreme Court left standing the victory in England, and left open
the possibility of a stronger ruling in the future.
72. See Swilley v. McCain, 374 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Tex. 1964).
73. Muldoon v. Musgrave, 545 S.W.2d 539, 541 (Tex. Civ. App. Fort Worth 1976);
see also 21 Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 856 S.W.2d 479, 483
(Tex. Civ. App. 1993).
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Rawls, to challenge the state "sodomy" statute in a civil proceed-
ing. In Louisiana Electorate of Gays and Lesbians, Inc. v. Louisi-
ana,7 4 the court preliminarily enjoined the State's "sodomy" law as
"manifestly unconstitutional," observing that gay men and lesbians
suffer real and irreparable injury from the threatened enforcement
of such statutes.
In fact, the Louisiana Electorate Court explicitly recognized the
harms that "sodomy" laws and the threat of arbitrary enforcement
have on gay men and lesbians.75 As set forth in the Lambda Brief,
such laws have a "direct deleterious and psychological effect on
lesbians and gay men," seeking to deprive them of "physical sexual
intimacy that is essential for physically and mentally healthy people
and for healthy relationships. '76 Furthermore, the enforcement of
"sodomy" laws destroys "property rights" of gay people." If found
to have committed "sodomy," gay men and lesbians would be sub-
ject to charges of professional misconduct and even revocation or
suspension of professional licenses, effectively ending their chosen
career.
78
The Louisiana Electorate Court concluded by declaring its inabil-
ity to imagine "an individual activity more personally private and
more deserving of constitutional privacy protection" than consen-
sual, private, and non-commercial sex between adults. 79 Because it
is "unconscionable that a law prohibiting such behavior be viewed
by any reasonable mind as anything other than a violation of the
constitutional right of privacy,"'8 the court held that the prohibi-
tion on non-commercial, consensual, private sex between adults is
an "anachronism in today's body of law." '81 The June 1994 trial
court ruling restored Louisiana to the "moving stream" 82 in the
trend of decisions striking down "sodomy" laws.
Meanwhile, courts in two other states have since jumped into the
anti-"sodomy"-law mainstream. In a preliminary ruling in Gryczan
v. Montana,83 a facial state constitutional challenge to the state
74. No. 94-9260, slip op. at 5-6 (La. Civ. Dist. Ct. June 23, 1994), cert denied, 640
So. 2d 1319 (La. 1994).
75. Id., slip op. at 6.
76. Id., slip op. at 6-7.
77. Id., slip op. at 7.
78. No. 94-9260.
79. Id.
80. Id. slip op. at 6.
81. Id.
82. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 499 ("our decision, rather than being the leading edge
of change, is but a part of the moving stream").
83. No. BDV-93-1869 (1st Dist. Lewis & Clark Cty), slip op. (June 28, 1994).
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"sodomy" law, the court upheld plaintiffs' standing and denied the
State's motion to dismiss. The court pointedly noted plaintiffs'
claims that
the statute fosters discrimination, harassment, and violence from
society. The statute has often caused Plaintiffs to alter the man-
ner in which they would normally conduct their lives. Plaintiffs
also allege that because the statute labels them as felons, it can
and has been used in third party contexts to deny or restrict
rights of Plaintiffs and other homosexuals.84
Citing the strong, explicit right to privacy language of Montana's
constitution, as well as its guarantee of equal protection, the court
refused "to deny Plaintiffs access to this forum when such basic
and fundamental constitutional rights are at issue[.]" 85
Meanwhile, in late June 1994, the Virginia Court of Appeals de-
clared that the "sodomy" law could not be used to deny a lesbian
86the custody of her son. It reversed a Henrico County trial court
ruling that relied on the "sodomy" statute as the most determina-
tive factor in taking a child from his lesbian mother.8 7 The trial
court had earlier decided that, because as a sexually active woman
in a committed relationship with her partner (also a woman), she
presumptively violated Virginia's "sodomy" statute, Sharon Bot-
toms was an unfit parent as a matter of law.88
In its closely-watched ruling, the Court of Appeals disagreed,
holding that the fact that Sharon Bottoms is a lesbian, and admit-
tedly engaging in "illegal" sexual activities, did not alone justify
taking custody of her son away from her and awarding custody to a
non-parent, in this case, Bottoms' mother.8 9 To justify taking away
the child, any such "criminal" conduct (oral sex) must have harm-
ful impact on the child; the court found no such impact.90
Coming so swiftly after the anomalous rulings in Baxley and
Morales, decisions such as Louisiana Electorate (with its condem-
84. Id. at 11.
85. Id. at 12.
86. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d at 281-83.
87. Id.
88. Again, this is an example of how "sodomy" laws are used against gay people.
Virginia's "sodomy" law applies to all adults, gay or non-gay, and yet only gay men
and lesbian parents stand to lose their children because they engage in, or are pre-
sumed to engage in, oral sex with their adult partners.
89. Bottoms, 44 S.E.2d at 282.
90. Id. Indeed, the court of appeals cited the undisputed evidence that lesbians
and gay men are fit parents, that children of gay parents grow up as health, happy,
and well-adjusted as the children of non-gay parents, and that a parent's sexual orien-
tation, gay or otherwise, is no indicator of parental fitness. 444 S.E.2d at 282-83.
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nation of the invasiveness of "sodomy" statutes), Bottoms (with its
condemnation of the use of such statutes to perpetrate a host of
evils on gay people), and Gryczan (with its condemnation of the
State's attempt to deprive gay plaintiffs of a judicial forum) signal
renewed hope to those across the country who seek to eliminate
such oppressive laws. Perhaps, this time around, should Louisiana
Electorate go up on appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court will rec-
ognize the "sodomy" statute for what it is and does. Meanwhile,
the fight will continue, or begin afresh, in the remaining unfree
states.
Because wiping away "sodomy" laws, whether in court or
through political means, remains a very high priority for Lambda,
for the gay rights movement, and for Americans concerned with
privacy and freedom generally, cases like Baxley, Bottoms, Shahar,
and Louisiana Electorate will receive much attention in the months
and years to come. Although lesbians and gay men seeking equal-
ity and basic human rights have come a long way from a time just
thirty-three years ago when every state had a "sodomy" law, six-
teen states and the federal government still penalize oral and anal
sex for all people, and five states single out same-sex oral and anal
intercourse for criminal penalties. Court challenges are now pend-
ing in Louisiana,91 Tennessee,92 and Montana,93 and there is legisla-
tive action in many states each year, from Missouri to Maryland.
The abolition of "sodomy" laws is both a gay issue and an issue
for all Americans to fight and win in both real and symbolic terms.
As we told the United States Supreme Court in Hardwick, the
question is not what people like Michael Hardwick are doing in the
bedroom, but rather what the State is doing there.94
91. Louisiana Electorate of Gays and Lesbians Inc. v. State, 640 So. 2d 1319 (La.
1994); Baxley, 633 So. 2d 142.
92. Campbell v. McWherter, No. 93C-1547 (Cir. Ct. Davidson Cty) (facial state
constitutional challenge).
93. Gryczan, No. BDV-93-1869 (1st Dist. Lewis & Clark Cty), slip op. (June 28,
1994).
94. Petition for Rehearing for Respondent at 10, Bowers v. Hardwick (No. 85-
130) (1986).
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"standing" to challenge the constitutionality of the state "crime against nature" statute.
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intimate association by allowing state proscription of consensual, private, non-commer-
cial sex between all adults, gay and non-gay alike. Furthermore, the selective enforce-
ment and invocation of these statutes, despite their facial applicability to all, shows the
government's purpose in stigmatizing and punishing gay people through official dis-
crimination. Such animus and invidious effect violate the equal protection guarantees
that state constitutions such as that of Louisiana expressly provide. *
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
STATE OF LOUISIANA
versus NO. 93-KA-2159
JOHNNY L. BAXLEY
DIRECT APPEAL FROM THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE PARISH OF ORLEANS, CASE NO. 356-945, SECTION "E,"
THE HON. CALVIN JOHNSON, JUDGE PRESIDING
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND,
INC. IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEE JOHNNY L. BAXLEY
R. JAMES KELLOGG
Cooperating Attorney
La. State Bar Number 7698
924 Congress Street
New Orleans, LA 70117
(504) 947-7264
EVAN WOLFSON
Senior Staff Attorney
ROBERT S. MOWER
Law Clerk
LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE
& EDUCATION FUND, INC.
666 Broadway, 12th Fl.
New York, NY 10021
(212) 995-8585
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
December 30, 1993
* EDITOR'S NOTE: The following amicus curiae brief was filed with the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court by Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund on December 30,
1993. Footnotes, however, have been altered to conform to the style of the Fordham
Urban Law Journal
POLICE IN OUR BEDROOMS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page*
CITATION OF AUTHORITIES ............................. iii
STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ..... x
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..... ................... 1
A RGU M ENT ............................... ................ 3
I. MR. BAXLEY HAS STANDING TO
CHALLENGE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
THE "CRIME AGAINST NATURE" STATUTE.... 3
A. Mr. Baxley Has Standing to Challenge the
"Crime Against Nature" Statute Because He Has
Been Charged With Violating It ................... 5
B. Mr. Baxley Has Standing to Challenge the
Constitutionality of R.S. 14:89(A)(1) Because He
is Subject to Conviction Under That Subsection
of the Statute in a Responsive Verdict ............ 6
C. As a Gay Man, Mr. Baxley Has Standing to
Challenge The Constitutionality of the "Crime
Against Nature" Statute Because the Statute
Causes Him, All Sexually Active Adults, and All
Gay Men and Lesbians, Actual Harm Beyond the
Present Prosecution ................................ 7
1. The "Crime Against Nature" Statute, Which
Criminalizes Intimate and Important Sexual
Conduct, Causes Psychological Harm to
Appellee and All Sexually Active Adults ...... 10
2. The Statute's Illegitimate Implicit
Condemnation of Gay People Underlies Much
Discrimination in Law Against Appellee and
Lesbians and Gay Men Generally ............. 16
3. The "Crime Against Nature" Statute
Promotes Hostility, Violence, and
Discrimination Against Gay People ........... 24
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT
THE "CRIME AGAINST NATURE" STATUTE
VIOLATES THE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEE OF PERSONAL PRIVACY .......... 28
A. In Applying State Constitutional Principles, This
Court Is Not Constrained by the Federal
* The page numbers on these tables correspond to the brief as originally filed
with the court.
1994] 1013
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXI
Judiciary's Interpretation of Federal
Constitutional Provisions .......................... 28
B. There is No Compelling State Interest Justifying
the Governmental Invasion of Privacy and
Usurpation of Individual Choice Embodied in the
"Crime Against Nature" Statute ................... 33
III. THE STATE'S ADMITTED SELECTIVE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE "CRIME AGAINST
NATURE" STATUTE, REVEALING ITS TRUE
PURPOSE AND EFFECT OF STIGMATIZING
GAY PEOPLE DESPITE THE STATUTE'S
FACIAL APPLICABILITY TO ALL, VIOLATES
THE EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEE OF
THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTION ................ 37
A. The "Crime Against Nature" Statute is
Selectively Enforced Against Lesbians and Gay
M en ................................................ 39
B. Such Selective Enforcement Reflects Illegitimate
Government Animus and Does Not Further Any
Appropriate State Interest ......................... 43
CO NCLU SIO N ............................................... 48
1014
POLICE IN OUR BEDROOMS
CITATION OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (Marshall, J.
dissenting) .................. ..................... 42
Bottoms v. Bottoms, No. CH93JA0517-00 (Va. Cir. Ct., Hen-
rico County, Sept. 7, 1993) ................................... 20
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), reh'g denied 478
U .S. 1039 (1986) .......................................... 28,30,36
Buttino v. F.B.I., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4659 ................ 21
Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W. 2d 891 (S.D. 1992) .......... 21
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432
(1985) ................................ ........................ 44
City of Dallas v. England, 846 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. App. Austin
1993) writ dism'd w.o.j. (May 5, 1993), reh'ng of writ of error
overruled (June 9, 1993) ..................................... 18,31
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) ...................... 9
Gay Activists Alliance v. Bd. of Regents, 638 P.2d 1116 (Ok.
1981) ....................................... .................. 21
Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592
(1979) ........................................................ 26,43
Gay Lib v. Univ. of Missouri, 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977), cert
denied sub nom Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 981 (1978).. 21
Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Center v. Ge-
orgetown Univ., 536 A.2d. 1 (D.C. App. 1987) .............. 24,43
Gay Students Organization v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir.
1974) .......................................................... 21
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) ................. 41
Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So.2d 398 (La. 1988)(on
reh'ng), appeal after remand, 612 So.2d 859 (La. Ct. App. 4th
Cir. 1992), cert. den., 615 So.2d 335 (La. 1993) ........... 33,34,35
Kentucky v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992) ....... 16,31,32,44
Latona v. Dep't of State Civil Service, 492 So.2d 27 (La. Ct.
App. 1st Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 496 So.2d 1043(La. 1986) ... 37
Michigan Organization for Human Rights v. Kelley, No. 88-
815820 CZ, slip op. (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 9, 1990) ............ 22,36
Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 982 (1977) ....................... 21
New Jersey v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333 (N.J. 1977) ............ 15
New York v. Onofre, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 51 N.Y.2d 476 (1980)
cert. denied 451 U.S. 987 (1981) ............................. 31,33
1994] 1015
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXI
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) ........................ 44
Pennsylvania v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980) ... 31,46
Roe v. Roe, 228 Va. 722, 324 S.E.2d 691 (1985) .............. 20
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) reh'ng denied 410 U.S. 959
(1973) ......................................................... 35
S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) ...... 21
Shahar v. Bowers, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 668 (N.D.
Ga. 1992), partial summ. judgment denied, summ. judgment
granted, dimissed 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.(BNA) 109 (N.D.
G a. 1993) ..................................................... 19
Sibley v. Bd. of Sup'rs of La. State Univ., 477 So.2d 1094 (La.
1985) (on reh'ng) ............................................ 29,42
Simmons v. City of Shreveport, 60 So.2d 867 (1952) .......... 38
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) ................... 38
State v. Anderson, 20 So.2d 288 (La. 1944) cert. denied, 324
U .S. 868 (1945) ....................... ....................... 39
State v. Bluain, 315 So.2d 749 (La. 1975) ..................... 5
State v. Breaux, 329 So.2d 696 (La. 1976) .................... 29
State v. Church, 538 So.2d 993 (La. 1989) .................... 29
State v. Hernandez, 410 So.2d 1381 (La. 1982) .............. 29,35
State v. Lindsey, 310 So.2d 89 (La. 1975) ..................... 5,41
State v. McCoy, 337 So.2d 192 (La. 1976) .................... 5
State v. Neal, 500 So.2d 374 (La. 1987) ....................... 5
State v. Perry, 610 So.2d 746 (La. 1992) ..................... 33,35
State v. Pruitt, 449 So.2d 154 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 450 So.2d 1309 (La. 1984), on reh'g 482 So.2d 820 (La.
Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 488 So.2d 1018 (La. 1986)
.......................... ..................................... 1,40
State v. Wigley, 624 So.2d 425 (La. 1993) ..................... 39
Steffan v. Aspin, 1993 WL 465530 (DC Cir. Nov. 16, 1993) .. 44
Succession of Thompson, 367 So.2d 796 (La. 1979) .......... 37
Texas v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Ct. App. Austin 1992)
writ granted 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1117 (Tex. 1992) set for submis-
sion Jan. 5, 1993 ............................................. 23,31
United States v. Barrios, 501 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1924) ........ 39
Valentine v. Thomas, 433 So.2d 289 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 440 So.2d 728 (La. 1983) ................. 38
Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. Wash. 1989)(en
banc)(Norris, J. and Canby, J., concurring in the judgment),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990) ..... .................. 43
Woodard v. Gallagher, No. 89-5776 (Orange Cty, Fla. Cir. Ct.)
(June 9, 1992) ................................................. 20
1016
POLICE IN OUR BEDROOMS
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) .................... 38
Statutes
La. Const. A rt. I, § 5 ......................................... 34
La. Const. A rt. I, § 3 ......................................... 37
La. Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 803 .................... 7
La. R .S. 14:82 ................................................. 45
L a. R .S. 14:89 ................................................. 4
La. R .S. 15:540-549 ........................................... 5
D.C. Act 10-23 (D.C. Code Supp. 1994) ...................... 31
Act of Dec. 6, 1972, P.L.1482, No. 334, § 1, 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 3101 (1973) .................................................. 46
Tex. Penal Code § 21.06 ...................................... 19
Authorities
Addenda, Wash. Post, June 18, 1993, at A2 .................. 31
D. Altman, The Homosexualization of America and the Amer-
icanization of the Homosexual (1982) ......................... 43
American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders 261-83 (3d ed. rev. 1987) ....... 13
Becker & Joseph, AIDS and Behavioral Change to Reduce
Risk: A Review, 78 Am. J. of Pub. Health 394, 394-410 (1988)
........................ . o...o...........o . . . .  o .o. 15
A. Bell & M. Weinberg, Homosexualities: A Study of Diver-
sity Among Men and Women (1978) ......................... 14,27
J. Berger, Teaching about Gay Life is Pressed by Chancellor,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1992, at B12 ............................ 21
P. Blumstein & P. Schwartz, American Couples (1983) ...... 11,14
E. Brecher, Love, Sex, and Aging: A Consumer's Union Re-
port (1984) .................................... ............... 12
W. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individ-
ual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977) ..................... 28,29
Callen & Planco, Attitudes Toward Oral-Genital Sexuality, 42
Conn. M ed. 500 (1978) ...................................... 13,14
G. Chauncey, "The Policed: Gay Men's Strategies of Everyday
Resistance" in Inventing Times Square: Commerce and Culture
at the Crossroads of the Worlds, 1880-1939 315-328 (W. Taylor
ed. 1991) ...................................................... 43
D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities: The Making of
a Homosexual Minority in the United States, 1940-1970 (1983)
................. .. ...... ................. .................. 4 3
1994] 1017
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXI
Devlin, Privacy and Abortion Rights Under the Louisiana
State Constitution: Could Roe v. Wade be Alive and Well in the
Bayou State? 51 Louisiana L. Rev. 685 (1991) ............... 29,35
Ekstrand & Coates, Maintenance of Safer Sexual Behaviors
and Predictors of Risky Sex: The San Francisco Men's Health
Study, 80 Am. J. of Pub. Health 973-977 (1990) .............. 15
FBI Policy on Homosexuals at Issue in Ex-Agent's Suit, L.A.
Times, November 26, 1993 at Al ............................. 22
Ford & Beach, Patterns of Sexual Behavior (1951) ........... 12
Gays Accuse U.S. Agencies of Bias, Chicago Tribune, May 2,
1993, at 1 ..................................................... 22
P. Gebhard & A. Johnson, The Kinsey Data: Marginal Tabula-
tions of the 1938-1963 Interviews Conducted by the Institute for
Sex Research (1979) ........................................... 14
P. Gibson, Gay and Lesbian Youth Suicide in U.S. Dep't of
Health and Human Services Youth Suicide Report 110 (1989)
................................................................ 14
Gonsiorek, Social Psychological Concepts in the Understand-
ing of Homosexuality, in Homosexuality: Social, Psychological
& Biological Issues 115-19 (W. Paul et al. eds. 1982) ......... 13
Gonsiorek & Rudolph, Homosexual Identity: Coming Out and
Other Developmental Events, in Homosexuality: Research Im-
plications for Public Policy 161 (J. Gonsiorek & J. Weinrich
eds. 1991) ..................................................... 13
Gonsiorek & Shernoff, AIDS Prevention and Public Policy:
The Experience of Gay Males, in Homosexuality: Research
Implications for Public Policy 240 (J. Gonsiorek & J. Weinrich
eds. 1991) ..................................................... 15
J. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity In and
After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 Virginia Law Review 1721
(1993) ........................................................ 17,32
Herek, Beyond "Homophobia": A Social Psychological Per-
spective on Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men, 10 J. Ho-
m osexuality 1 (1984) ......................................... 25,26
Herek, Stigma, Prejudice, and Violence Against Lesbians and
Gay Men, in Homosexuality: Research Implications for Public
Policy (J. Gonsiorek & J. Weinrich eds. 1991) ................ 25
Herek & Berrill, Violence Against Lesbians and Gay Men: Is-
sues for Research, Practice, and Policy, J. of Interpersonal Vio-
lence (special issue) (1990) ................................... 25
Herek, Hate Crimes Against Lesbians and Gay Men: Issues for
Research and Policy, 44 American Psychologist 948 (1989) .. 25
1018
POLICE IN OUR BEDROOMS
Herek, The Context of Anti-Gay Violence: Notes on Cultural
and Psychological Heterosexism, 5 J. of Interpersonal Vio-
lence 316-333 (1990) .......................................... 26
S. Hite, The Hite Report: Nationwide Study of Female Sexual-
ity (1976) ...................................................... 13
S. Hite, The Hite Report on Male Sexuality (1981) ........... 13
M. Hunt, Sexual Behavior in the Seventies 198-199 (1974)... 12
International Survey of AIDS Educational Messages and Be-
havior Change (1988 data collected by Lewis Harris & Associ-
ates for Project Hope, Center for Health Affairs, 2 Wisconsin
Circle, Chevy Chase, Maryland) .............................. 12
J. Joseph, Black Mondays: Worst Decisions of the Supreme
Court 65-74 (1987) ............................................ 30
E. Kennedy and M. Davis, Boots of Leather, Slippers of Gold:
The History of a Lesbian Community (1993) ................. 43
A. Kinsey, W. Pomeroy, C. Martin, & P. Gebhard, Sexual Be-
havior in the Human Female (1935) .......................... 13
Letter of James G. Sweeney, The New Republic, Jan. 3, 1994,
p .5  ............... .............................................  11
Levine, Employment Discrimination Against Gay Men, 9 Int'l
Rev. of Modern Sociology 151 (1977) ....................... 24,27
Levine & Leonard, Discrimination Against Lesbians in the
Work Force, 9 Signs 700 (1984) .............................. 24,27
R. Marcus, Powell Regrets Backing Sodomy Law, Wash. Post,
O ct. 26, 1990 .......................... ....................... 30
M. Masters & V. Johnson, Human Sexual Inadequacy
(1970) ......................................................... 13
D. McWhirter & A. Mattison, The Male Couple: How Rela-
tionships Develop (1984) .................................. 11,14,15
Mohr, Gays/Justice: A Study of Ethics, Society and Law 123-24
(1988) ......................................................... 40
Nevada Repeals Sodomy Law, Wash. Times, June 16, 1993, at
B 5 ............................................................. 3 1
Note, Chipping Away at Bowers v. Hardwick: Making the Best
of an Unfortunate Decision, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 154 (1988)... 30
Peplau, What Homosexuals Want in Relationships, 15 Psychol-
ogy Today 28 (1981) .......................................... 15
Powell Concedes Error in Key Privacy Ruling, N.Y. L.J., Oct.
26, 1990, at 1, col. 3 ........................................... 30
Reinig, Sin, Stigma, and Society: A Critique of Morality and
Values in Democratic Law and Policy, 38 Buffalo L. Rev. 859
(1990) ......................................................... 1
1994] 1019
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXI
Reinisch, Sanders & Ziemba-Davis, The Study of Sexual Be-
havior in Relation to the Transmission of Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus: Caveats & Recommendations, 43 American
Psychologist 922 (1988) ....................................... 12
D. Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to
Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten
Constitution, 30 Hastings L. J. 957 (1979) .................... 11
Schneider & Lewis, The Straight Story on Homosexuality and
Gay Rights, 7 Pub. Opinion 16 (Feb./Mar. 1984) ............. 26
Schneider, Coming Out at Work: Bridging the Private/Public
Gap, 13 Work and Occupations 463 (1986) ................... 27
Senators Loudly Debate Gay Ban, N.Y. Times, May 8, 1993 at
9 ........................................................... 1,16,17
Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1508 (May
1989) .......................................................... 30
Speech by President Clinton, July 19, 1993 ................... 26
Statement of Charles R. Jackson, Executive Vice President,
Non-Commissioned Officers Association Before the Republi-
can Study Committee on Homosexuals in the Armed Forces,
Federal News Service, December 9, 1992 ..................... 17
C. Tavris & S. Sadd, The Redbook Report on Female Sexuality
(1977) ......................................................... 11
Testimony of Dr. James 0. Mason, Acting Assistant Secretary
for Health and Human Services, to the House of Representa-
tives Republican Study Committee (Nov. 7, 1985) ........... 16
L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 15-21, at 1421-35
(1977) ......................................................... 30
Wells & Kline, Self-Disclosure of Homosexual Orientation, 127
J. of Soc. Psychology 191 (1987) .............................. 27
Wolfson, Civil Rights, Human Rights, Gay Rights: Humanity
and the Humanity of the Different, 14 Harv. J of L. & Pub.
Pol'y 21 (1991) ................................................ 24
Wolfson, "Sexual Orientation Discrimination," in M. Ros-
sein, Employment Discrimination: Law and Litigation, ch. 28
(Clark Boardman, rev. ed.) (1993) ............................ 24
1020
POLICE IN OUR BEDROOMS
STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
This amicus curiae brief is submitted by Lambda Legal Defense
and Education Fund, Inc. ("Lambda") in support of the appellee,
Johnny L. Baxley. A not-for-profit corporation based in New
York, Lambda engages in precedent-setting litigation in all sub-
stantive areas affecting the rights of lesbians and gay men.
Founded in 1973, Lambda is the oldest and largest national legal
organization devoted to these concerns, and has appeared as coun-
sel or amicus curiae in numerous cases in state and federal courts
on behalf of lesbians and gay men who have suffered discrimina-
tion or been deprived of their equal rights because of their sexual
orientation. In particular, Lambda has appeared as counsel or has
participated as amicus curiae in several similar cases-i.e., Bowers
v. Hardwick, Michigan Organization for Human Rights v. Kelley,
City of Dallas v. England, Kentucky v. Wasson, New York v.
Onofre1 -involving challenges to statutes prohibiting consensual
sexual conduct.
At stake in this case is the scope of the right to privacy guaran-
teed by the Louisiana Constitution, as well as the constitutional
right of gay men and lesbians and to equal protection of the laws.
The lower court's ruling striking down La.R.S. 14:89 as an uncon-
stitutional invasion of the privacy rights of Louisiana citizens
decriminalized primary modes of sexual and affectional expression
for most Americans, including gay men and women. It also invali-
dated a law, the main purpose and effect of which has been to stig-
matize lesbians and gay men both in Louisiana and generally.
Lambda therefore has a compelling interest in assisting this Court
in reaching a just result in this important case.
1. Full cites are provided as each case is discussed infra.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
"[S]odomy is against the law....
Heterosexuals don't practice sodomy. [sic]"
Senator Strom Thurmond 2
"[AIll previously reported cases dealing with
this crime involved homosexual encounters"
State v. Pruitt3
On its face, Louisiana's "crime against nature" statute criminal-
izes normal, healthy sexual intimacy between consenting adults,
gay and non-gay alike. Through the statutory prohibition on oral
and anal intercourse, the State purports to dictate to Louisiana citi-
zens its own notions of the acceptable moral parameters of per-
sonal sexual expression. This intrusion upon such profoundly
personal conduct and choices violates the right to freedom from
"invasions of privacy" guaranteed by Article I, Section 5 of the
Louisiana Constitution.
A further offense to the constitution arises from the statute's
true purpose and effect, stigmatizing lesbians and gay men, as be-
trayed by the State's record of selective enforcement (and non-en-
forcement).4 Because it is understood and used as an anti-gay
measure, the statute effectively codifies gay second-class citizen-
ship, fosters hostility, misunderstanding, and violence, and under-
lies other discrimination against lesbians and gay men in law.
Moreover, by outlawing our expressions of love and sexuality, the
statute causes us tangible psychological harm and emotional pain,
assaulting our human dignity.
Mr. Baxley, who has been arrested and charged with a five-year
felony, clearly has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
very statute that has placed his personal liberty at jeopardy. Con-
trary to the State's disingenuous assertion, the "solicitation" as-
pects of this case do not obviate Mr. Baxley's standing to challenge
the precise statute under which the State charged him. Mr. Baxley
is subject to conviction under both the "solicitation" and "non-so-
licitation" prongs of the "crime against nature" statute because,
2. Senators Loudly Debate Gay Ban, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1993, at 9. See
discussion infra at 16-17.
3. 449 So. 2d 154, 156 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 450 So. 2d 1309 (La.
1984), on reh'g 482 So. 2d 820 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 488 So. 2d 1018
(La. 1986). See discussion infra at 40.
4. See generally, Timothy W. Reinig, Sin, Stigma, and Society: A Critique of Mo-
rality and Values in Democratic Law and Policy, 38 BuiF. L. REV. 859 (1990); see also
discussion infra at 37.
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even were a jury to find no "compensation" involved in this case,
Mr. Baxley could be found guilty of attempting to commit a "crime
against nature" under the "non-solicitation" branch of the statute.
Furthermore, this Court has historically declined to sever the inter-
dependent clauses of this statute, and has instead interpreted its
subsections much as the State has used it here, in an inclusive
manner.
This Court has declared, in both its privacy and equal protection
jurisprudence, that the Louisiana Constitution is itself a font of in-
dividual liberties with protections which extend beyond those re-
quired by the federal judiciary's interpretation of our federal
Constitution. If the right to privacy and autonomy means anything,
it is the right of the individual, married or unmarried, gay or non-
gay, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into mat-
ters so profoundly personal as decisions regarding how to express
love, affection, intimacy, and sexuality between consenting adults.
If the right to equal protection means anything, it is that the State
may not maintain a statute to stigmatize and harm a class of peo-
ple, or incite prejudice against them.
This Court now has the opportunity to take down the "Sword of
Damocles" that hangs so ominously over the heads of Louisiana's
gay and lesbian citizens. The Court may do so safe in the knowl-
edge that other provisions of Louisiana law provide the State with
ample and more narrowly tailored means to achieve any legitimate
goals. By striking down the "crime against nature" statute, the
Court will both significantly disarm those who would discriminate
against lesbians and gay men, and meaningfully reinforce the most
important values of our democratic society - individual freedom,
respect for diversity, and equal justice for all.
ARGUMENT
I. MR. BAXLEY HAS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE "CRIME AGAINST
NATURE" STATUTE
Johnny Baxley, a Louisiana citizen, was arrested in public by po-
lice officers, charged with a felony, arraigned and released on
bond, and prosecuted for a crime that could result in his incarcera-
tion for five years. Nevertheless, the State would have this Court
hold that Mr. Baxley does not have standing to challenge the con-
stitutionality of the statute under which he has been arrested.
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The State urges the Court to obtain this astonishing result by
severing the interdependent clauses of R.S. 14:89 (inextricably con-
joined under the present statutory structure), focusing solely on its
allegations of a commercial aspect to the facts of this case, ignoring
Mr. Baxley's exposure to a potential conviction for the lesser in-
cluded offense of attempted violation of subsection R.S.
14:89(A)(1), and disregarding previous instances in which this
Court has granted a defendant standing to challenge the constitu-
tionality of this very statute.5 The State also asks this Court to turn
a blind eye to the harmful impact that even the mere existence of
R.S. 14:89 has on Mr. Baxley and all gay people, the State's record
of selective enforcement, and what that record reveals about the
true, illegitimate purpose behind the "Crime Against Nature"
statute.
5. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (West 1986)[hereinafter R.S. 14:89] states:
A. Crime against nature is:
(1) The unnatural carnal copulation by a human being with another of the
same sex or opposite sex or with an animal, except that anal sexual inter-
course between two human beings shall not be deemed as a crime against
nature when done under any of the circumstances described in R.S. 14:41,
14:42, 14:42.1 or 14:43. Emission is not necessary; and, when committed by a
human being with another, the use of the genital organ of one of the offend-
ers of whatever sex is sufficient to constitute the crime.
(2) The solicitation by a human being of another with the intent to engage
in any unnatural carnal copulation for compensation.
B. Whoever violates the provisions of this Section shall be fined not
more than two thousand dollars, or imprisoned, with or without hard labor,
for not more than five years, or both.
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A. Mr. Baxley Has Standing to Challenge the "Crime Against
Nature" Statute Because He Has Been Charged With
Violating It
Mr. Baxley has been charged with a five-year felony which, if he
is convicted, would brand him a Sex Offender under La. R. S.
15:540 through 549 and would require him to register with the
Sheriff of his Parish of domicile for ten full years after his convic-
tion or release from imprisonment, whichever came first. La. R.S.
15:542 & 15:544. Mr. Baxley's liberty interests could not be more
directly at stake, nor could a case or controversy be more fully
before this Court. Clearly, Mr. Baxley has standing to challenge
the very statute that has placed his liberty in jeopardy. In light of
the direct threat that the "crime against nature" statute poses to
Mr. Baxley, as well as the discrimination and inequality such stat-
utes invite against all lesbians and gay men in Louisiana and else-
where, the State's contention that the trial court indulged in an
"advisory opinion" by declaring the statute unconstitutional on pri-
vacy grounds is simply untenable.
Furthermore, as the lower court correctly noted, this Court has
willingly entertained a number of other constitutional challenges to
the "crime against nature" statute and "has never denied the de-
fendant standing to raise the claim."6 Indeed, just six years ago, the
Court allowed a defendant who, like Mr. Baxley, had been charged
with soliciting a "crime against nature" pursuant to R.S. 14:89, to
challenge the federal constitutionality of R.S. 14:89.7 It would be
manifestly unfair to now deny Mr. Baxley, who has been arrested
under the very same statute, the opportunity to challenge the con-
stitutionality of that statute under his own state's constitution.
In entertaining other constitutional challenges to R.S. 14:89, this
Court has not, as the State suggests, separated the interdependent
clauses of the statute. Rather, the Court has consistently dealt with
the two provisions in an inclusive manner. In fact, in Neal, this
Court considered defendant's constitutional challenge to the stat-
ute as a whole, despite the fact that the bill of information specifi-
cally charged her with violating only subsection (A)(2) of R.S.
14:89. Here, the bill of information hauling Mr. Baxley into court
did not specify a subsection, but simply charged that appellee "...
did wilfully and unlawfully violate R.S. 14:89, relative to Crime
6. Judgment at 3. See, e.g., State v. Bluain, 315 So. 2d 749 (La. 1975); State v.
Lindsey, 310 So. 2d 89 (La. 1975); State v. McCoy, 337 So. 2d 192 (La. 1976).
7. State v. Neal, 500 So. 2d 374 (La. 1987).
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Against Nature. . ." (R-1). Surely, if the bill of information in-
volved in Neal warranted this Court's consideration of the statute
as structured, the same full consideration is warranted here.
B. Mr. Baxley Has Standing to Challenge the Constitutionality
of R.S. 14:89(A)(1) Because He is Subject to
Conviction Under That Subsection of the Statute in
a Responsive Verdict
Even if, as the State insists, R.S. 14:89(A)(2) could somehow be
severed from R.S. 14:89(A)(1), Mr. Baxley would remain exposed
to a conviction for attempt to engage in consensual oral sex, pro-
scribed by R.S. 14:89(A)(1). This possibility is especially likely if,
at trial, the jury rejects the police officer's assertion and concludes
that Mr. Baxley did not, in fact, offer or demand compensation, a
critical element of the offense proscribed by 14:89(A)(2). A jury
might nonetheless determine that, although no money was men-
tioned, Mr. Baxley did propose engaging in oral sex. Since, under
Article 803 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure,8 the trial
court must charge the jury with the law applicable to all other in-
cluded offenses of which the appellee could be found guilty, the
jury might feel constrained to return a verdict of guilty of at-
tempted violation of R.S. 14:89(A)(1).
Thus, even were this Court to accept the State's strained reading
of the statute as severable, and to overlook the bill of information
actually filed in this case, Mr. Baxley would still remain exposed to
possible conviction under R.S. 14:89(A)(1). Because he is subject
to prosecution under both subsections of the statute, he has stand-
ing to challenge the constitutionality of either section of the statute
or both.
C. As a Gay Man, Mr. Baxley Has Standing to Challenge The
Constitutionality of the "Crime Against Nature" Statute
Because the Statute Causes Him, All Sexually
Active Adults, and All Gay Men and
Lesbians, Actual Harm Beyond the Present Prosecution
Mr. Baxley also has standing to challenge the constitutionality of
the "crime against nature" statute, not only because he has been
8. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 803 (West 1981), provides:
When a count in an indictment sets out an offense which includes other
offenses of which the accused could be found guilty under the provisions of
Article 814 and 815, the court shall charge the jury as to the law applicable
to each offense.
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arrested under the statute and is subject to conviction under all of
its parts, but also because the statute's very existence causes real
and serious harm to him and to all lesbians, gay men, and other
sexually active persons living in Louisiana. The statute improperly
intrudes where the State has no business interfering; the State then
compounds the intrusion with selective and stigmatizing use of the
statute to render gay men and lesbians in Louisiana second-class
citizens.
Scientific, demographic, and clinical knowledge demonstrates
that the intimate sexual conduct prohibited by the "crime against
nature" statute is healthy and often important to the mental health
and happiness of individuals and their deepest relationships, and is
engaged in often by many, if not most, Americans. See Point I
(C)(1) at 10 below. Moreover, the choice as to whether to engage
in such sexual conduct is a highly personal and important one for
most, if not all. By criminalizing such healthy and important activ-
ity and choices, even in the privacy of the home, the "crime against
nature" statute violently invades the personal autonomy of all sex-
ually active persons in Louisiana. See Point II, at 28 below.
In addition, the State's record of selectively enforcing and invok-
ing the statute against Louisiana's gay and lesbian citizens betrays
its stigmatizing impact and purpose, violating the guarantee of
equal protection. See Point III, at 37 below. As a sexually active
adult, and as a gay man, Mr. Baxley properly has standing to chal-
lenge this unlawful government conduct.
The State would deprive Mr. Baxley and the others harmed daily
by the statute of an opportunity to be heard before this Court. It
first asserts that, notwithstanding the open-ended bill of informa-
tion in this case, the "crime against nature" statute "is simply not
applied in a non-solicitation context,"9 and then maintains that Mr.
Baxley lacks standing to raise a privacy-based constitutional chal-
lenge to the statute because he was arrested in an alleged solicita-
tion context.10 Clearly, if this statute is not enforced in a non-
solicitation context and yet standing to raise a privacy-based consti-
tutional challenge is predicated on being arrested in such a context,
the courts will simply never hear challenges, such as Mr. Baxley's,
to an oppressive statutory scheme. If the State were to prevail in
its argument against standing, Louisiana citizens - particularly its
9. State's Brief at 12. It is puzzling, to say the least, that the State would devote
so much of its scarce resources, not to mention the resources of this Court, to its effort
to defend the constitutionality of an assertedly unenforced provision of R.S. 14:89.
10. Id. at 7-8.
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lesbian and gay citizens - whose interests are harmed by the very
existence of this statute, would be denied any opportunity to assert
and protect their rights.1'
1. The "Crime Against Nature" Statute, Which Criminalizes
Intimate and Important Sexual Conduct, Causes
Psychological Harm to Appellee and All Sexually
Active Adults.
Appellee is a gay man who, like other gay and non-gay adults,
regularly engages in private sexual acts, choosing personal conduct
and entering consensual relationships that the State has no proper
business invading. All non-gay sexually active adults in Louisiana
live under an ostensible threat of prosecution under R.S. 14:89 for
precisely this kind of sexual and intimate conduct or for proposing
the same to other consenting adults; because of R.S. 14:89, all gay
people, including Mr. Baxley, live under an ever-present legally-
enforced stigma, and a real and often realized threat of prosecu-
tion. Because R.S. 14:89's prohibition of important intimate action
thus causes psychological harm beyond the present prosecution,
Mr. Baxley has standing to challenge the statute's facial
overbreadth.
Sexuality is fundamental to the lives and relationships of all peo-
ple, gay and non-gay, married and unmarried. In both gay and
non-gay couples, sex functions as a complex bond between the
partners, an opportunity to express and satisfy many human needs,
desires, and even aspects of one's identity in this world. Many
have extolled "the majesty of true sexuality... its earthiness; its
mystical and exalted power of momentary union between two
humans; its capability of ameliorating the natural aloneness of the
11. The United States Supreme Court addressed a similar standing issue in Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). The Court ruled that, in raising a privacy-based
constitutional challenge to a restrictive contraception statute, a contraceptives manu-
facturer had standing to assert the rights of unmarried persons who "[were] not them-
selves subject to prosecution and, to that extent, [were] denied a forum in which to
assert their own rights." Id. at 446. The Court stated, "more important than the na-
ture of the relationship between the litigant and those whose rights he seeks to assert
is the impact of the litigation on the third party interests." Id. at 445. Here the inter-
ests of all gay men, lesbians and sexually active persons in Louisiana are appropriately
raised by Mr. Baxley. And unlike in Eisenstadt, Mr. Baxley does not seek merely to
assert the interests of third-party classes not themselves before the court. Rather, he
is himself a member of those classes, as well as being personally subject to prosecution
and conviction under all parts of the statute.
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human condition; and its ability to replenish the human soul."' 2
"Having sex is an act that is rarely devoid of larger meaning for a
couple. It always says something about partners' feelings about
each other, what kind of values they share, and the purpose of their
relationship."' 3 For all couples, "a good sex life is central to a good
overall relationship."' 4 Gay and non-gay men and women share
the fundamental value in sexuality, and make choices that should
be equally protected by the constitutional guarantee of personal
privacy.
Although many inappropriately and incorrectly assume that only
gay men and lesbians engage in "sodomy" or "crimes against na-
ture," (see discussion at 16 below), in fact the oral and anal sex
proscribed by Louisiana's "crime against nature" statute is com-
mon among predominantly heterosexual people. In 1983, a major
study of couples in the United States found that 90% of the mar-
ried and unmarried heterosexual couples studied had engaged in
oral-genital sex.15 Another study found that approximately 80% of
unmarried men and women aged 25-34 have done so.' 6
Although less information is available on the incidence of anal
intercourse between women and men, one representative national
sample showed that 18.3% of the men reported having engaged in
anal intercourse with a woman, and 7.3% of the women reported
having engaged in anal intercourse with a man.' 7 One researcher
12. James G. Sweeney, Letter to the Editor, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 3, 1994, at 5;
see also David A.J. Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Pri-
vacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J.
957 (1979).
13. PHILLIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES 193 (1983).
[hereinafter BLUMSTEIN & SCHWARTZ].
14. Id. at 201, 205-206; see DAVID P. MCWHIRTER & A. MATrISON, THE MALE
COUPLE: How RELATIONSHIPS DEVELOP (1984) [hereinafter MCWHIRTER & MATTI-
SON] 262 (1984).
15. BLUMSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 11, at 236. This national study of 12,000
people compared married couples, unmarried heterosexual couples, gay male couples,
and lesbian couples currently living together. The researchers also reported that 72%
of married and unmarried heterosexual couples engaged in fellatio, and 74% engaged
in cunnilingus, every time they had sex, frequently, or sometimes. Id. See also CAROL
TAVRIS & SUSAN SADD, THE REDBOOK REPORT ON FEMALE SEXUALITY (1977)
(85% of married couples engaged in cunnilingus, and over 83% engaged in fellatio,
often or occasionally); MORTON HUNT, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE SEVENTIES 199
(1974) (90% of married couples under 25 years old engaged in oral sex)[hereinafter
Hunt].
16. HUNT, supra note 15. Another major study reported that after reaching the
age of 50, 43% of women and 56% of men had engaged in cunnilingus. EDWARD
BRECHER, LOVE, SEX, AND AGING: A CONSUMER'S UNION REPORT, 358-59 (1984).
17. INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF AIDS EDUCATIONAL MESSAGES AND BEHAVIOR
CHANGE (1988 data collected by Lewis Harris & Associates for Project Hope, Center
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found that 25% of married couples under 35 years old had engaged
in anal intercourse in the year preceding the study.18 A recent re-
view of the published literature weighted results by their sample
size and estimated that 18% of heterosexual men and 39% of het-
erosexual women have had at least one experience of heterosexual
anal intercourse. 19 Without doubt, therefore, much of the sexual
activity in Louisiana - among heterosexual and gay people, men
and women, young and old, married and unmarried - involves the
oral or anal sex proscribed by the "crime against nature" statute.2 °
Whatever the lip service some in society pay to the contrary,
mental health professionals consider this diverse sexual expression
between consenting adults as indicating, indeed promoting, mental
health.2' Engaging in a variety of sexual expression, including the
oral and anal sex proscribed by the "crime against nature" statute,
does not result in mental or physical dysfunction;22 rather, enforced
repression of desire for such expression is associated with dysfunc-
tion and pathology, particularly where accompanied by stigma and
discrimination.23 Research also reveals that oral and anal sex can
for Health Affairs, 2 Wisconsin Circle, Chevy Chase, Maryland). Of course, in many
cultures, anal intercourse is encouraged, in part based on lingering cultural attitudes
about the significance of "virginity" and as an alternative to potentially procreative
sex. See, e.g. CLELLAN S. FORD & FRANK A. BEACH, PATTERNS OF SEXUAL BEHAV-
IOR 130 (1951).
18. HUNT, supra note 15, at 204. Six percent of the sample reported engaging in
anal intercourse "sometimes" or "often."
19. June Machover Reinisch, et al., The Study of Sexual Behavior in Relation tothe
Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus: Caveats & Recommendations, 43
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 922 (1988).
20. See also, SHERE HITE, The Hite Report: Nationwide Study of Female Sexuality
(1976); SHERE HITE, The Hite Report on Male Sexuality (1981); and ALFRED KINSEY
et al., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE (1953).
21. A substantial majority of Americans consider oral-genital contact to be "a part
of normal sex," a recent study found. Callen & Planco, Attitudes Toward Oral-Genital
Sexuality, 42 CONN. MED. 500, 502 (1978) (91% of persons under 35, and 78% of all
persons, said they consider oral sex normal). Moreover, the American Psychiatric
Association removed homosexuality from its list of disorders in 1973. See AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 261-83 (3d ed. rev. 1987).
22. Mental problems associated with such sexual expression, whether engaged in
by heterosexual or gay people, are usually the product of internalized social condem-
nation of those who practice it. Thus, the pathologies sometimes associated with vari-
ant sexual conduct can be viewed as social rather than personal pathologies. See,
John C. Gonsiorek et al., Social Psychological Concepts in the Understanding of Ho-
mosexuality, in HOMOSEXUALITY: SOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL & BIOLOGICAL ISSUES
115-19 (William Paul et al. eds. 1982).
23. WILLIAM H. MASTERS & VIRGINIA JOHNSON, HUMAN SEXUAL INADEQUACY
(1st ed. 1970); see JOHN C. GONSIOREK & RUDOLPH, HOMOSEXUAL IDENTITY: COM-
ING OUT AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EVENTS, IN HOMOSEXUALITY: RESEARCH
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significantly benefit both heterosexual and gay relationships. In-
deed, a 1978 study showed that a majority of Americans believe
that "oral-genital sex leads to better and happier relationships."24
Just as the choice to engage in oral and anal sex is important to
many non-gay people, oral and anal sex are among the primary
forms of sexual expression available to gay people.25 As with het-
erosexual couples, lesbian and gay male couples who engage in oral
sex are (on the whole) happier than those who do not.26 Gay peo-
ple also benefit by engaging in behavior that affirms their self-con-
cept, provides emotional satisfaction, and allows the formation of
long-term bonds.27
In response to the AIDS epidemic, of course, most gay men, in
those populations that have been studied, have now had to educate
and reinforce themselves to use condoms during anal intercourse
- as should everyone in any form of intercourse involving the po-
tential exchange of semen, blood, or other body fluids. 28 Frank ac-
IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 161-76 (1991); P. Gibson, Gay and Lesbian Youth
Suicide in U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES YOUTH SUICIDE REPORT
110 (1989) ("[.] The root of the problem of gay youth suicide is a society that discrimi-
nates against and stigmatizes homosexuals.").
24. Callen and Planco, supra note 21, at 502.
25. One study reports that 89% of male couples and 77% of lesbian couples regu-
larly engage in oral sex. Only 1% and 4% respectively reported never engaging in oral
sex with their partners. BLUMSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at 236. Seventeen
percent of male couples and 12% of lesbian couples reported engaging in oral sex
every time they had sexual relations. Id. Seventy percent of male couples reported
regularly engaging in anal intercourse. Id. at 243 Kinsey Institute studies have re-
ported estimates that 59% and 95% of gay men have engaged in anal intercourse. P.
GEBHARD & A. JOHNSON, THE KINSEY DATA: MARGINAL TABULATIONS OF THE
1938-1963 INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED BY THE INSTITUTE FOR SEX RESEARCH (1979);
A. BELL & M. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALITIES: A STUDY OF DIVERSITY AMONG MEN
AND WOMEN at 328-30 (1978)[hereinafter BELL & WEINBERG]. Another major study,
limited to male couples, found that about 95% of the sample reported engaging in
fellatio and 71% reported engaging in anal intercourse at some time during the pre-
ceding year. MCWHIRTER & MATIISON, supra note 14, at 277.
26. BLUMSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at 239-40 (lesbian and gay male
couples). Married men who engage in oral sex with their wives are happier with their
sex lives and more satisfied with their relationships in general than those who do not.
The same is true for men in unmarried heterosexual couples. Id. at 231 (married and
unmarried heterosexual couples). Only for heterosexual women does engaging in
oral sex not correlate - positively or negatively - with happiness in the relationship.
Id. at 233-37.
27. MCWHIRTER & MATTISON, supra note 14, at 262; BELL & WEINBERG, supra
note 25, at 217-18; Letitia Anne Peplau, What Homosexuals Want in Relationships, 15
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 28 (1981).
28. Ekstrand & Coates, Maintenance of Safer Sexual Behaviors and Predictors of
Risky Sex: The San Francisco Men's Health Study, 80 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 973-77
(1990); Becker & Joseph, AIDS and Behavioral Change to Reduce Risk: A Review, 78
AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 394, 394-410 (1988).
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knowledgment of reality is a necessary prerequisite to promoting
health in one's sense of self, behavior, and choices in all respects; it
is clear that the "crime against nature" statute - the true purpose
and effect of which is [to] stigmatize lesbians and gay men - does
not reflect the reality and non-gay people's sexual conduct and
choices.29
2. The Statute's Illegitimate Implicit Condemnation of Gay
People Underlies Much Discrimination in Law Against
Appellee and Lesbians and Gay Men Generally.
Notwithstanding the facial application of R.S. 14:89 to gay and
non-gay people alike, and despite the reality (demonstrated above)
of the fact that both non-gay and gay people in Louisiana routinely
engage in the conduct the statute proscribes, R.S. 14:89 is perva-
sively misused, both as a prohibition on the sexual activity of gay
people alone, and, even worse, as a stamp of second-class citizen-
ship on gay people, regardless of individual conduct. Over time,
and due in large part to the State's selective endforcement [sic]
(and non-enforcement), R.S. 14:89 has become the instrument, not
of a meaningful curb on conduct, but rather of a stigma on homo-
sexuality and gay identity, sanctioning many forms of discrimina-
tion against lesbians and gay men.
For example, at one point during his strenuous efforts against
permitting gay people openly to serve our country in the military,
Senator Strom Thurmond, shouted, "[S]odomy is illegal" and
"[h]eterosexuals don't practice sodomy."3 ° Although Senator
Thurmond's statement elicited laughter in the Senate hearing
room,31 his inaccuracy and his deliberate equation of ostensibly
neutral, illegal "sodomy" with gay people are no laughing matters.
In the Senator's dangerous formulation, "sodomy" is such a de-
fining characteristic of gay people, and so exclusive to us, that it
may constitute a rhetorical proxy for us, and a legal basis for deny-
29. Such statutes are in no way a public health measure, and, indeed, undoubtedly
undermine the fight against HIV and other public health concerns. See, e.g., Ken-
tucky v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 489-90 (Ky. 1992). New Jersey v. Saunders, 381 A.2d
333, 341-42 (N.J. 1977) (criminal penalties add little or no deterrent force to fear of
contracting serious illness).
30. Senators Loudly Debate Gay Ban, supra note 2. "Sodomy," of course, often
refers to the same conduct characterized as "crime against nature."
31. Id. ("The comment by Mr. Thurmond, the ranking Republican on the commit-
tee, brought laughter from the audience.")
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ing us other basic rights.32 As the following discussion amply illus-
trates, the Senator is not alone in making this equation. And,
indeed, R.S. 14:89, like all "sodomy" statutes, hangs over the heads
of all lesbians and gay men, an omnipresent and potent weapon
routinely used to deny gay people a wide range of rights and
benefits.
The "sodomy" provision of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
("UCMJ") featured significantly, if hypocritically, in the govern-
ment's justification for upholding the ban against lesbians and gay
men in the military.33 The "sodomy" provision of the UCMJ, like
R.S. 14:89, applies as much to heterosexual men and women as it
does to gay men and women. Still, it is brandished exclusively
against lesbians and gay men, not only to punish oral or anal sex
when gay people engage in them, but as a basis for massively re-
stricting our ability, regardless of conduct, to serve our country
openly and to share in the myriad benefits and career opportunities
that stem from military service. The purported need to root out
"homosexual acts" and those with a "propensity" to engage in
them (notwithstanding the UCMJ's ostensible neutrality as to the
gender of those engaging in oral or anal sex), is not just invoked to
justify anti-gay discrimination, but also to justify such discrimina-
tion without real regard to whether individuals actually engage in
the acts prohibited by the UCMJ. 34
Another classic example of anti-gay prejudice masking as the en-
forcement of a "sodomy" statute is found in a Texas case, City of
Dallas v. England. There, the Dallas Police Department denied
32. For an in-depth discussion of the popular equation of "sodomy" with homo-
sexuality, see Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity In and After
Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721 (1993).
33. Senators Loudly Debate Gay Ban, supra note 2. See also Statement of Charles
R. Jackson, Executive Vice President, Non-Commissioned Officers Association
Before the Republican Study Committee on Homosexuals in the Armed Forces, FED-
ERAL NEWS SERVICE, December 9, 1992 ("NCOA suggests to the committee that
prior to any change in current policy [regarding the presence of gays in the military],
efforts must be redirected to making homosexual conduct legal in all states. .. ").
34. Nothing in the latest incarnation of the military regulations, announced on
December 22, 1993, changes either the core anti-gay discrimination or the disingenu-
ous attempt to base it in part on the UCMJ. After all, if neutral enforcement of the
neutral UCMJ were in fact the objective, there would be no need to single out gay
and lesbian service personnel for restrictions, special "rebuttable presumptions," or
the like. The regulations reflect yet another impermissible effort to reclassify speech
and identity as conduct, conduct selectively prohibited when associated, accurately or
otherwise, with gay people.
35. 846 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Ct. App. Austin 1993), writ denied w.o.j. (May 5, 1993),
reh'ng of writ of error overruled (June 9, 1993).
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the plaintiff employment because she stated truthfully that she was
a lesbian. Deeming her thus to be in violation of a departmental
policy that singled out for rejection, among others, those who had
engaged in same-sex sex since the age of 16, or who had engaged in
sex with an animal since the age of 17 (!), the Department argued
that as a lesbian, Ms. England could be presumed in continuing
violation of the Texas "sodomy" statute, Tex. Penal Code § 21.06.36
There was of course no such evidence, nor were any charges
brought directly under the statute itself.
The trial court ruled the state "sodomy" statute, and the discrim-
inatory anti-gay policy that purported to derive from it, unconstitu-
tional, a decision affirmed by the appellate courts. The court
clearly saw that the anti-gay impact of the criminal statute was
squarely before it, even though the case arose in the employment
context.
In another recent case, an attorney was fired from the Office of
the State Attorney General of Georgia because she engaged in a
religious marriage with another woman.37 The woman had worked
as a summer clerk at the Attorney General's Office, had graduated
at the top of her law school class, and had passed the Georgia bar
exam. Still, Georgia Attorney General Michael Bowers cited
Georgia's "sodomy" law - which, like Louisiana's, on its face neu-
trally proscribes oral or anal sex as to men and women, gay and
non-gay, married and unmarried - as a fit basis for his refusal to
hire a qualified open lesbian:
[r]egardless of whether [pilaintiff has actually committed sod-
omy..., the Attorney General is justified in withdrawing the of-
fer of employment in order to ensure public perception (and the
reality) that his [d]epartment is enforcing and will continue to
enforce the laws of the State.38
36. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (West 1994) provides:
§ 21.06. Homosexual Conduct.
(a) A person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse
with another individual of the same sex.
(b) An offense under this section is a Class C misdemeanor.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.01 defines "Deviate sexual intercourse" as:
(A) any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the
mouth or anus of another person; or
(B) the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an
object.
37. Shahar v. Bowers, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 668 (N.D. Ga. 1992) partial
summary judgment denied, summary judgment granted, dismissed 63 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 109 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
38. Id. at 671, citing Defendant's Reply, at 11 note 5.
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Once again a statute that on its face reaches everyone, a statute in
fact rarely if ever enforced directly, was used to punish a gay per-
son never even accused of violating it.
Similarly, in Florida, the Orange County Sheriff fired a deputy,
despite his concededly "exemplary" record, when it was discovered
that he was gay.39 The sheriff's office cited the existence of "sod-
omy" laws as a justification for the dismissal, noting that Florida
prohibits oral or anal sex (again, however, ostensibly applying to
all, gay and non-gay alike), and that deputies might have to work
with agencies in other states that also have such laws. The court
implicitly rejected such arguments (as well as the implication that
private consensual sexual conduct could be criminalized), and
found that the anti-gay discrimination violated the state constitu-
tional right to privacy. Ultimately, after a four-year struggle, the
deputy won his job back.
"Sodomy" statutes are also frequently invoked to deny lesbians
and gay men custody of, or even visitation with, their children.40
Indeed, in New York City, a local school board has even invoked
"sodomy" as a justification for preventing school teachers from
teaching their students about the mere existence of lesbian or gay
parents.41  Laws such as R.S. 14:89 have also been invoked to jus-
tify bans on gay people assembling or communicating the availabil-
ity of services.42
At the national level, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Central Intelligence Agency, and other federal government agen-
39. Woodward v. Gallagher, No. S9-5776 (Orange Co., Fla. Cir. Ct. filed June 9,
1992).
40. See, e.g., Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891, 896 (S.D. 1992); Roe v. Roe,
324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985); Bottoms v. Bottoms No. CH93JA0517-00 (Va. Cir. Ct.,
Henrico County, filed Sept. 7, 1993).
41. Joseph Berger, Teaching about Gay Life is Pressed by Chancellor, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 1992, at B12 (quoting the President of a Queens school board as characteriz-
ing the proposed material as "aimed at promoting acceptance of sodomy.")
42. See, e.g., Gay Lib. v. Univ. of Mo., 558 F.2d 848, 850 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied sub nom, Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 981 (1978) (reversing district court
which "ruled that the school officials justified their action of the ground that recogni-
tion... would probably result in the commission of felonious actis of sodomy. .. ");
Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073, 1075-76 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 982 (1977) ("sodomy" statute invoked to justify newspaper's refusal
to print advertisement for gay counseling and legal aid because of professed concern
regarding abetting "criminal" activity); Gay Students Org. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652,
662-63 (1st Cir. 1974)(ban on gay social function invalid despite university's asserted
interest in "preventing illegal activity which may include 'deviate' sex acts [and] 'las-
civious carriage' "); Gay Activists Alliance v. Bd. of Regents, 638 P.2d 1116, 1121-22
(Ok. 1981) (lower court upheld refusal by regents to grant organization recognition
because of mere existence of Oklahoma law against homosexual activity).
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cies have consistently dismissed employees identifying or identified
as gay or lesbian.43 Officials in those agencies routinely cited the
existence of state "sodomy" statutes such as R.S. 14:89 as a justifi-
cation for the denial of employment or special security clearances
for gay men and lesbians." For example, in one instance, a private
investigator in San Francisco was told by the FBI that it would be
hard for the agency to hire her because, since she is a lesbian, the
FBI would not be able to transfer her to any of the states, like
Louisiana, with "sodomy" laws. 5
Every instance of anti-gay discrimination by national entities
such as the FBI, CIA, or even large corporations directly impli-
cates R.S. 14:89. When using "sodomy" or "crime against nature"
statutes to justify overt discrimination, agency and company offi-
cials do not necessarily point to specific statutes, let alone specific
details or provisions; rather, they invoke the existence of all "sod-
omy" statutes generally (and, as we have seen, often invoke them
in a selective, discriminatory fashion). Louisiana's "crime against
nature" statute is therefore used by others throughout the country
to deny lesbians and gay men equality in opportunities to which
they would otherwise be entitled.
Finally, two courts have granted standing to gay persons to chal-
lenge state "sodomy" statutes in civil proceedings.46 In Michigan, a
plaintiff group - comprised of gay men, lesbians, a bisexual man
and woman, heterosexual men and women, and a woman with a
physical disability - was granted standing to challenge the consti-
tutionality of Michigan's "sodomy" and "gross indecency" statutes.
The Wayne County Circuit Court concluded that, although none of
the plaintiffs had actually been arrested under the statute, they had
standing to seek declaratory relief in a civil proceeding because
43. Seepe.g., Buttino v. F.B.I., No. c-90-1639-SBA, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4659, at
*17 (U.S. Dist. Ct. February 11, 1992) ("Plaintiff has submitted evidence - and in-
deed it is undisputed - that the FBI has had a history of anti-gay discrimination.")
The FBI has now announced a non-discrimination policy, pursuant to a departmental
directive issued by Attorney General Reno on December 2, 1993, and a settlement
stipulation in Buttino.
44. FBI Policy on Homosexuals at Issue in Ex-Agent's Suit, L.A. TIMES, November
26, 1993 at Al ("the bureau has said homosexual conduct poses concerns about the
potential for 'unlawful' activities - several states have anti-sodomy laws - and se-
curity lapses.").
45. Gays Accuse U.S. Agencies of Bias, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, May 2, 1993, at 1.
46. See Michigan Organization for Human Rights ("MOHR") v. Kelley, No. 88-
815820 CZ, slip op. (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 9, 1990); Texas v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201
(Tex. Ct. App. Austin 1992) writ granted 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1117 (Tex. 1992) set for
submission Jan. 5, 1993.
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the statutes caused them real and serious harm by their very
existence:
The individually named Plaintiffs in the instant case have all vio-
lated at least one of the statutes in question and have testified
by way of affidavits, as to the fears and harm they face in their
lives currently as a result of their continuous violations. Plain-
tiffs' fears are legitimate and real and constitute a basis for an
actual controversy.47
In the Texas case, the Texas Court of Appeals similarly granted
standing to five gay persons (three women and two men) to chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the Texas "sodomy" statute in a civil
proceeding. The Court found that, although none of the plaintiffs
had been arrested or charged under the statute, they suffered and
suffer serious harm from the statute's very existence:
[Appellees] argue that the existence of § 21.06 implicitly con-
dones hate crimes against lesbians and gay men, encourages dis-
crimination in our legal system, and raises the potential threat of
arrest, fine, and pecuniary loss. Further, they assert that the stat-
ute brands lesbians and gay men as criminals and thereby legally
sanctions discrimination against them in a variety of ways unre-
lated to the criminal law. For example, according to appellees,
the stigma of criminality arising from the statute encourages dis-
crimination in the context of employment, family issues, and
housing ....
We conclude that appellees have standing to attack the consti-
tutionality of § 21.06 because they have shown that the statute
causes actual harm which goes far beyond the mere threat of
prosecution. Because of these consequences to appellees, we
cannot agree with the State that this case is hypothetical, ab-
stract or generalized.48
3. The "Crime Against Nature" Statute Promotes Hostility,
Violence, and Discrimination Against Gay People.
Even aside from its frequent, if illogical, invocation in the legal
arena, the "crime against nature" statute works significant harm on
gay people in this State and in society. Lesbians and gay men are a
stigmatized group in American society, stamped through prejudice
47. MOHR v. Kelley, slip opinion at 5.
48. Morales, 826 S.W.2d at 202-203 (emphasis added). Although the Texas
equivalent of R.S. 14:89 on its face singles out conduct between people of the same
sex, Louisiana's "crime against nature" results in the same stigmatizing effects, partic-
ularly in light of the way it is selectively enforced and invoked, and the general equa-
tion, however doubly inaccurate, of "sodomy" with gay people.
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and ignorance with the classic stereotypes of dehumanization. 9
Nationally, we are the victims of extensive discrimination,5 0 inter-
personal prejudice,5 ' and violence 52 because of our sexual orienta-
tion. Regrettably, the State of Louisiana is no exception to this
general truth. Indeed, the lower court heard testimony regarding
the discrimination and police abuse aimed at the lesbian and gay
community of New Orleans. 3
Societal values are learned by individuals as they mature and in
their adult life. The society communicates particular values and
attitudes to its members in many ways, including through its laws.
In addition to their specific impact on individuals, laws serve a
symbolic function by codifying the values - or at least the
preached values - of the society. Thus, laws that penalize specific
forms of sexual expression, or that come to be used or understood
as branding a particular group as outlaws, convey a message of so-
cial disapproval to all citizens. They reinforce individual hostility
against the people who practice (or who are deemed to practice)
such behaviors, or who are inaccurately held to be "the class de-
fined by the conduct" ostensibly proscribed by the law.54
Ironically, there are values the law should be conveying instead.
In a democratic society, the laws should reinforce the importance
of, and respect for, individual choice and freedom. Laws should
encourage tolerance and celebrate diversity rather than foster ig-
norance and instill prejudice. They should not become the vehicle
for hypocrisy regarding the personal or sexual conduct of some,
while serving as the engine for attacks on others.
49. See Evan Wolfson, Civil Rights, Human Rights, Gay Rights: Humanity and the
Humanity of the Different, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 21 (1991).
50. See, e.g., Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Center v. Ge-
orgetown Univ., 536 A.2d.1, 35 (D.C. App. 1987). See also Evan Wolfson, "Sexual
Orientation Discrimination," in M. Rossein, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: LAW
AND LITIGATION, ch. 28 (Clark Boardman, rev. ed., 1993); Levine, Employment Dis-
crimination Against Gay Men, 9 INT'L REV. OF MODERN SOCIOLOGY 151 (1977)
[hereinafter Levine]; Levine & Leonard, Discrimination Against Lesbians in the Work
Force, 9 SIGNS 700 (1984)[hereinafter Levine & Leonard].
51. Herek, Beyond "Homophobia": A Social Psychological Perspective on Atti-
tudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men, 10 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 1 (1984) [hereinafter
Herek, Beyond "Homophobia"]; Herek, Stigma, Prejudice and Violence Against Les-
bians and Gay Men, in HOMOSEXUALITY, [hereinafter Herek, Stigma].
52. Herek, Stigma, supra, note 51; Herek & Berrill, Violence Against Lesbians and
Gay Men: Issues for Research, Practice, and Policy, J. OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE
(special issue 1990); Herek, Hate Crimes Against Lesbians and Gay Men: Issues for
Research and Policy, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 948, 948-55 (1989).
53. Supplemental Record at 124-34.
54. Herek, The Context of Anti-Gay Violence: Notes on Cultural and Psychological
Heterosexism, 5 J. OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 316-33 (1990).
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Yet another way in which laws such as R.S. 14:89 affect individ-
ual attitudes is by restricting opportunities for interaction between
gay and non-gay people. Empirical research has consistently
demonstrated that having a relationship with an openly gay person
is one of the most powerful influences on heterosexuals' accept-
ance of and tolerance for gay people.5 5  In order for this interac-
tion to occur, the gay man or lesbian must disclose his or her sexual
orientation to the heterosexual person. Such disclosure is inhibited
most often by fears concerning the stigmatization that might follow
such exposure. 6 By promoting stigma, R.S.14:89 inhibits disclosure
by gay people of their sexual orientation. This, in turn, prevents
heterosexuals from interacting with openly gay people which, in
turn, reinforces unconstitutional and socially destructive anti-gay
prejudice.
This Court can break the vicious cycle of stigma and disen-
franchisement in which the State through R.S. 14:89 has played so
grievous a role. It should recognize, as the courts in Texas, Michi-
gan, and Kentucky have recently, that the mere existence of stat-
utes such as R.S. 14:89 causes actual harm to lesbians and gay men
beyond the threat of prosecution. Mr. Baxley, a gay man who has
actually been prosecuted under R.S. 14:89, surely has standing to
challenge the statute and its overreach. By repudiating R.S. 14:89's
brand of inferiority on lesbians and gay men, the Court will elimi-
nate it as a weapon serving no legitimate social or governmental
purpose.
55. Herek, Beyond "Homophobia", supra, note 51, at 1, 1-21; Schneider & Lewis,
The Straight Story on Homosexuality and Gay Rights, 7 PUB. OPINION 16 (Feb./Mar.
1984) at 16, 16-20, 59-60. In announcing the Administration's version of the anti-gay
military policy on July 19, 1993, President Clinton acknowledged that "those who
have studied this issue extensively have discovered an interesting fact: people in this
country who are aware of having known homosexuals are far more likely to support
lifting the ban." Speech by President Clinton, July 19, 1993, p.2 . Laws that compel
people to hide their identities, or that reinforce stigma, clearly prevent the very social
and political interaction essential to removing prejudice, inequality, and the fear and
ignorance that underlie them. In this sense, coming out, being able to identify oneself
as lesbian or gay, is political expression essential to a democratic society and the gay
people within it. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592, 610
(1979) ("one important aspect of the struggle for equal rights is to induce homosexual
individuals to 'come out of the closet'. ... ").
56. BELL & WEINBERG, supra note 25; Levine, supra note 50, at 151; Levine &
Leonard, supra, note 50, at 700; Schneider, Coming Out at Work: Bridging the Private/
Public Gap, 13 WORK AND OCCUPATIONS 463, 463-87 (1986); Wells & Kline, Self-
Disclosure of Homosexual Orientation, 127 J. OF Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 191, 191-97
(1987).
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II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE
"CRIME AGAINST NATURE" STATUTE VIOLATES
THE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF
PERSONAL PRIVACY.
A. In Applying State Constitutional Principles, This Court Is
Not Constrained by the Federal Judiciary's Interpretation of
Federal Constitutional Provisions.
The case at bar was argued and decided solely on state constitu-
tional grounds. Therefore, contrary to the State's assertion, this
Court's recognition in Neal, 500 So.2d 374, that Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) reh'g denied 478 U.S. 1039 (1986), at
present forecloses a federal constitutional challenge to R.S. 14:89 is
not dispositive of this case. Indeed, the United States Supreme
Court, when deciding Hardwick, expressly acknowledged "the
right or propriety.., of state-court decisions invalidating [sodomy]
laws on state constitutional grounds."57
As the trial court correctly noted, "[i]t is axiomatic that a State
Constitution can give its citizens more freedom than its Federal
counterpart. ' 58 In fact, this Court has on several occasions held
that the Louisiana constitution is more protective of individual
rights than the federal constitution. 9 In 1982, the Court stated:
"[w]e, of course, give careful consideration to the United States
Supreme Court interpretations of relevant provisions of the federal
constitution, but we cannot and should not allow those decisions to
57. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190. Indeed, Justice Brennan has argued that "the very
premise of the cases that foreclose federal remedies constitutes a clear call to state
courts to step into the breach. With the federal locus of our double protections weak-
ened, our liberties cannot survive if the states betray the trust the [United States
Supreme] Court has put in them .... With federal scrutiny diminished, state courts
must respond by increasing their own." W. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Pro-
tection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 503 (1977).
58. Judgment at 3. In 1977, Justice Brennan emphasized the increasingly critical
role of state courts in the protection of individual liberties:
"[s]tate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full
protections of the federal Constitution. State constitutions, too, are a font of
individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required
by the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law. The legal revolution
which has brought federal law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the
independent protective force of state law - for without it, the full realiza-
tion of our liberties cannot be guaranteed."
Brennan, supra note 50 at 491.
59. See State v. Church, 538 So. 2d 993, 996 (La. 1989); Sibley v. Bd. of Sup'rs of
La. State Univ., 477 So. 2d 1094, 1108 (La. 1985); State v. Breaux, 329 So. 2d 696, 700
(La. 1976); See generally, Devlin, Privacy and Abortion Rights Under the Louisiana
State Constitution: Could Roe v. Wade be Alive and Well in the Bayou State? 51 LA. L.
REV. 685, 688 (1991).
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replace our independent judgment in construing the constitution as
adopted by the people of Louisiana.'"60 When defining the scope of
individual liberties guaranteed by the Louisiana constitution,
therefore, this Court is not bound by federal caselaw and should
decline to follow it when valid reasons lead to a different
conclusion.6 1
Clearly, this case is one in which valid reasons exist to decline to
follow the federal example. Critical response to the Supreme
Court's majority opinion in Hardwick has been uniformly harsh.
In fact, "[c]ommentators have been virtually unanimous in their
criticism of Hardwick's reading of the Court's privacy jurispru-
dence. ' 62 Moreover, former Justice Lewis Powell, the "swing vote"
on the bitterly divided Hardwick Court, has declared that he
"probably made a mistake" in voting to uphold the "sodomy" law,
stating that, in retrospect, "the dissent had the better of the
arguments. 63
Thus, a majority of the Hardwick Court is now on record as be-
lieving that the Georgia "sodomy" statute should have been de-
clared an unconstitutional infringement on the federal right to
privacy. Rather than impose upon the citizens of Louisiana the
"mistake" made by the Hardwick then-majority, this Court should
recognize, as did the Hardwick dissenters, that "depriving individu-
als of the right to choose for themselves how to conduct their inti-
mate relationships poses a far greater threat to the values most
deeply rooted in our Nation's history than tolerance of noncon-
formity could ever do.'64
60. State v. Hernandez, 410 So. 2d 1381, 1385 (La. 1982)(emphasis added).
61. "[S]tate court judges... do well to scrutinize constitutional decisions by federal
courts, for only if they are found to be logically persuasive and well-reasoned, paying
due regard to precedent and the policies underlying specific constitutional guarantees,
may they properly claim persuasive weight as guideposts when interpreting counter-
part state guarantees." Brennan, supra note 57 at 502.
62. Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508, 1523 note 30 (May
1989) (majority opinion's analysis departs from established privacy doctrine). See also
J. JOSEPH, BLACK MONDAYS: WORST DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT 65-74
(1987) (including Hardwick among "worst" Supreme Court opinions); L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-21, at 1421-35 (critique of decision by attor-
ney who argued Hardwick in Supreme Court); Note, Chipping Away at Bowers v.
Hardwick: Making the Best of an Unfortunate Decision, 63 N.Y.U.L.REv. 154
(1988)(criticizing Hardwick and suggesting ways to minimize its effect on future
cases).
63. See Powell Concedes Error in Key Privacy Ruling, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 26, 1990, p.1,
col. 3.; Ruth Marcus, Powell Regrets Backing Sodomy Law, WASH. POST, Oct. 26,
1990 at A3.
64. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 214 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Since Hardwick, courts in other states have struck down "sod-
omy" statutes as violative of !state constitutional guarantees. 65
Most recently, the Kentucky Supreme Court, in a careful and
learned opinion, described Hardwick as "a misdirected application
of the theory of original intent," [and] noted that "in the space of
three decades half the states decriminalized this conduct," and
ruled that the Kentucky "sodomy" statute violated the right to pri-
vacy guaranteed by the Kentucky constitution.66 In Texas, the
Third District Court of Appeals similarly rejected the Hardwick
opinion and struck down the Texas sodomy statute as violative of
the right to privacy guaranteed by the Texas constitution, explicitly
stating that "the Texas Constitution accords individuals greater
safeguards to their personal freedom than its federal counterpart
does. 6
7
Additionally, twenty-six states have repealed their "sodomy"
and "crime against nature" statutes since the 1961 adoption of the
Model Penal Code, which repudiated intrusive laws. This year two
jurisdictions, the District of Columbia68 and the State of Nevada 69
joined in removing their statutes from the books. This history of
judicial vigilance and legislative repeal means that as of now, there
are but four state statutes that continue to single out "homosexual
sodomy," and sixteen states which purport to criminalize both het-
erosexual and homosexual "sodomy" - of which Louisiana's
"crime against nature" statute is one.70 As the Kentucky Supreme
Court noted when striking down the Kentucky "sodomy" statute,
"our decision, rather then being the leading edge of change, is but
a part of the moving stream."
The State's contention that "none of these cases [from other
states] involved solicitation for sexual favors"'7 1 is not only inapt, it
is simply untrue. The Kentucky Supreme Court struck down the
Kentucky "sodomy" statute in a case which, like the present case,
65. See City of Dallas v. England, 846 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. 1993); Kentucky v. Was-
son, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992); Texas v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. 1992);
MOHR v. Kelley, No. 88-815820 CZ, slip op. (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 9, 1990). Prior to
Hardwick, see New York v. Onofre, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980) cert. denied 451 U.S. 987
(1981); Pennsylvania v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980).
66. Id.
67. Morales, 826 S.W.2d at 204.
68. See D.C. AcT 10-23 (D.C. Code Supp. 1994)
69. See Nevada Repeals Sodomy Law, WASH. TIMES, June 16, 1993, at B5; Ad-
denda, WASH. POST, June 18, 1993, at A2 (reporting that Nevada Governor Robert J.
Miller had signed the repeal into law).
70. See generally Halley, supra note 32 at 1774-76.
71. State's Brief at 12.
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involved a defendant who was charged with "having solicited an
undercover . . . policeman to engage in deviate sexual inter-
course." 72 The State's contention that the other state cases in-
volved only "non-commercial sexual relations ' 73 ignores the
existence of the Pennsylvania case. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court struck down that state's "sodomy" statute on facts involving
sexual acts performed in a commercial theater with members of the
audience.74 Additionally, the alleged "public" nature of the facts
of this case do not differ significantly from the facts of the Ken-
tucky and Pennsylvania cases. The New York Court of Appeals,
the highest court of New York State, also struck down the New
York consensual "sodomy" statute in a case involving sexual acts in
a car parked on a public street.75
Clearly, other courts have realized that they are not barred from
addressing the privacy ramifications of a statute which seeks to reg-
ulate intensely intimate conduct simply because that statute may
have been enforced in a solicitation context. This Court is similarly
free to address R.S. 14:89's violation of the constitutional guaran-
tee of personal privacy.
B. There is No Compelling State Interest Justifying the
Governmental Invasion of Privacy and Usurpation of
Individual Choice Embodied in the "Crime Against
Nature" Statute.
By invading the private sexual intimacies of consenting adults,
the "crime against nature" statute places an intolerable burden on
the right of personal privacy guaranteed by the Louisiana Constitu-
tion. "[W]here a decision as fundamental as those included within
the right of personal privacy is involved, state action imposing a
burden on it may be justified only by a compelling state interest,
and the state action must be narrowly confined so as to further
only that compelling interest. '7 6 The State thus must demonstrate
that it has a compelling interest in interfering with the intensely
personal conduct, and policing the anatomical choices, of con-
senting adults living in Louisiana.
72. Wasson, 842 S.W. 2d at 488.
73. State's Brief at 12.
74. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47.
75. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936.
76. State v. Perry, 610 So.2d 746, 760 (La. 1992); See also Hondroulis v. Schuh-
macher, 553 So.2d 398 (La. 1988)(on reh'ng), appeal after remand, 612 So.2d 859 (La.
Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 615 So.2d 335 (La. 1993).
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Not surprisingly, the State has adduced no interest, compelling
or otherwise, for regulating such inherently private and important
personal matters. Nor has it borne its burden of demonstrating that
a more "narrowly confined," well-tailored law, i.e., the regulation
of prostitution, would not meet any purported legitimate
objectives.
Article I, Section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution clearly pro-
vides that "every person shall be secure. . . against unreasona-
ble.... invasions of privacy. '77 This Court has stated that Article I,
Section 5 was intended to embody an affirmative right to privacy
beyond criminal search and seizure law, "establishing the principles
of the Supreme Court decisions in explicit statement instead of de-
pending on analogical development. '7 8
As this Court has itself acknowledged, the Louisiana right to pri-
vacy "is not a duplicate of the Fourth Amendment or merely coex-
tensive with it; it is one of the most conspicuous instances in which
our citizens have chosen a higher standard of individual liberty
than that afforded by the jurisprudence interpreting the federal
constitution. '79 Just last year, in State v. Perry, this Court ob-
served: "[a]n individual's constitutionally protected interest in his
mind, thoughts and mental processes was. . . recognized by the
77. ARTICLE 1, SECTION 5 reads as follows:
Right to privacy
Section 5. Every person shall be secure in his person, property, commu-
nications, houses, paper, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures,
or invasions of privacy. No warrant shall issue without probable cause sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
search, the persons or things to be seized, and the lawful purpose or reason
for the search. Any person adversely affect[ed] by a search or seizure con-
ducted in violation of this Section shall have standing to raise its illegality in
the appropriate court.
78. Hondroulis, 553 So.2d at 415.
79. Hernandez, 410 So.2d at 1385. See also Church, 538 So.2d at 996 (quoting same
passage from Hernandez); Devlin, supra n. 52 at 689 ("Because the federal and Loui-
siana constitutions do differ with respect to the right of "privacy"- that right is ex-
plicitly protected in the text of the state constitution but has only been inferred into
the federal Constitution- it is a particularly likely candidate for independent inter-
pretation under the two documents."). The Louisiana constitution was drafted, de-
bated and ultimately ratified during the period from January 1973 to April 1974. By
that time, the right to privacy in the sense of autonomy had already been extended to
the right to make certain choices about one's personal or family life. Indeed, Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) reh'g denied 410 U.S. 959 (1973), was handed down just
months before the provisions of the Louisiana constitution were debated by the mem-
bers of the Louisiana legislature. As Professor Devlin has pointed out, "it seems
scarcely possible that the committee members could have failed to appreciate the
potential import of a state constitutional right to 'privacy.'" Devlin, supra at 700.
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Supreme Court prior to the adoption of our state Constitution. 8 0
Nor is that interest confined merely to desire, affection, or thought;
personal conduct, expression and autonomy partake of protection.
In Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, the Court held that, under the
Louisiana constitution, "[the] right of personal privacy includes the
interest in independence in making certain kinds of important deci-
sions. 8 1 The Court embraced the autonomy conception of privacy
articulated so eloquently long ago by Justice Brandeis: "no right is
held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded at common law,
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of
his own person. . . 'to be left alone.' ",82 Indeed, in extending the
protection of Article I, § 5 to the decision to obtain or reject medi-
cal treatment, the Court based its decision on the fact that "the
choice of whether to undergo... medical treatment is to an ex-
traordinary degree an intrinsically personal decision."83
It is difficult to imagine a more "intrinsically personal decision"
than the type of decisions that the State seeks to regulate through
R.S. 14:89. See Point I (C) (1), supra. The Michigan Court of Ap-
peals, in striking down the Michigan "sodomy" statute, recognized
the profoundly personal nature of this type of decision:
A mature individual's choice of an adult sexual partner, and sex-
ual relations, in the privacy of his or her own home, appears to
this Court to be an intensely personal matter. State regulations
affecting "adult sexual relations" or personal decisions in mat-
ters of sex, done in one's home are subject to the strictest stan-
dard of judicial review.
MOHR v. Kelly, slip opinion at 11. As Justice Blackmun elo-
quently stated in his Hardwick dissent:
Only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that sex-
ual intimacy is 'a sensitive, key relationship of human existence,
central to family life, community welfare, and the development
of human personality.' (citation omitted) The fact that individu-
als define themselves in a significant way through their intimate
sexual relationships with others suggests, in a Nation as diverse
as ours, that there may be many "right" ways of conducting
those relationships, and that much of the richness of a relation-
ship may come from the freedom an individual has to choose the
form and nature of his intensely personal bonds.... [A] neces-
80. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 758.
81. Hondroulis, 553 So.2d at 414 (emphasis added).
82. Perry, 610 So.2d at 757, citing Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 756.
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sary corollary of giving individuals freedom to choose how to
conduct their lives is acceptance of the fact that different indi-
viduals will make different choices.... Freedom to differ is not
limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a
mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to
differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order. (ci-
tation omitted) It is precisely because the issue raised by this
case touches the heart of what makes individuals what they are
that we should be especially sensitive to the rights of those
whose choices upset the majority.84
This Court should reestablish the boundary protecting the freedom
of all adults in choices regarding consensual sexual conduct. The
State simply has no legitimate business invading the decision of
non-gay people or gay people as to whether to engage in oral or
anal sex.
III. THE STATE'S ADMITTED SELECTIVE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE "CRIME AGAINST
NATURE" STATUTE, REVEALING ITS TRUE
PURPOSE AND EFFECT OF STIGMATIZING GAY
PEOPLE DESPITE THE STATUTE'S FACIAL
APPLICABILITY TO ALL, VIOLATES THE EQUAL
PROTECTION GUARANTEE OF THE LOUISIANA
CONSTITUTION.
Article I, Section 3 of the Louisiana Constitution provides that
"no persons shall be denied the equal protection of the laws."85
"The equal protection guarantee of Article I, § 3 requires state
laws to affect alike all persons and interests similarly situated."86
In the landmark Yick Wo v. Hopkins case, the Supreme Court em-
phasized that a law need not be facially discriminatory to run afoul
of this fundamental principle:
84. 478 U.S. at 205, 211.
85. LA, CONST. ART. I, SEC. 3 provides as follows:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law shall
discriminate against a person because of race or religious ideas, beliefs or
affiliations. No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discrimi-
nate against a person because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition,
or political ideas or affiliations. Slavery and involuntary servitude are pro-
hibited, except in the latter case as punishment for crime.
86. Succession of Thompson, 367 So. 2d 796, 798 (La. 1979); see also Latona v.
Dep't of State Civil Service, 492 So. 2d 27, 30 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1986) cert. denied,
496 So. 2d 1043 (La. 1986); Valentine v. Thomas, 433 So. 2d 289, 292 (La. Ct. App. 1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 440 So. 2d 728 (La. 1983).
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Though the law itself be fair on its face, and impartial in appli-
ance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority
with ... an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and
illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances,
material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within
the prohibition of the constitution.87
This Court, too, has long embraced the Yick Wo principle in in-
terpreting both the federal and state constitutions. "Although the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Yick Wo... was
handed down in the year 1886, the principle of constitutional law
therein asserted has not changed through the corridors of time. 88
In elaborating on the Yick Wo principle, the Supreme Court has
emphasized that targeting a specific group for differential treat-
ment compounds the severity of the unequal application:
When the law lays an unequal hand on those who have commit-
ted intrinsically the same quality of offense... it has made as
invidious a discrimination as if it had selected a particular race
or nationality for oppressive treatment.89
Because the State's discriminatory enforcement and invocation of
the "crime against nature" statute have remade it into a sword
wielded with "an unequal hand" to stigmatize and oppress gay peo-
ple, this Court should strike it down.9°
A. The "Crime Against Nature" Statute is Selectively Enforced
Against Lesbians and Gay Men.
The history of prosecutions under the "crime against nature"
statute represents the epitome of selective, discriminatory enforce-
ment and intentional misconstruction of a facially neutral law, as
Senator Thurmond reminds us.91 Although R.S. 14:89 clearly pros-
87. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
88. Simmons v. City of Shreveport, 60 So. 2d 867, 872 (La. 1952).
89. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
90. Indeed, just months ago, the Louisianna Supreme court favorably cited a Mis-
sissippi case which held that "statutes imposing fee caps, though not unconstitutional
on their face, may be unconstitutional as applied." State v. Wigley, 624 So. 2d 425, 430
n.5 (La. 1993)(citing Wilson v. State, 574 So. 2d 1338 (Miss. 1990)).
91. The unequal application of a facially neutral law must include an element of
purposeful discrimination in order to rise to the level of a denial of equal protection.
State v. Anderson, 20 So. 2d 288, 290 (La. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 868 (1945).
This discriminatory intent "may... be shown by extrinsic evidence showing a discrimi-
natory design to favor one individual or class over another not to be inferred from the
action itself." Id. Here, the State's bold admission that it does not uniformly apply
the "crime against nature" statute, combined with the judiciary's frank acknowledg-
ment that the statute has historically been prosecuted exclusively against gay men and
lesbians amply satisfies the requisite showing of intentional or purposeful discrimina-
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cribes certain sexual activity "by a human being with another of the
same sex or opposite sex," the statute is in fact enforced almost
exclusively against lesbians and gay men. It is rarely, if ever, used
to prosecute heterosexuals.
In 1984, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals frankly
acknowledged that "all previously reported cases dealing with this
crime involved homosexual encounters."92 The court added that
"any statement in prior cases which purported to include hetero-
sexual oral sex in the definition of unnatural carnal copulation
would be dicta .... - Furthermore, the State has itself conceded
that the statute is prosecuted on a selective basis: "R.S. 14:89 is
simply not applied in a non-solicitation context... [T]he use of the
statute against non-commercial sexual conduct between consenting
adults is 'unlikely.' " State's Brief at 12 (citation omitted).
Unfortunately, the State's asserted non-enforcement has elimi-
nated neither the intrusion into personal decisions, nor the stat-
ute's impact on Louisiana's lesbian and gay citizens. As Mr.
Baxley's case shows, the threat remains; as demonstrated above, so
does the stigma. Moreover, even if the claim of selective non-en-
forcement were true, it would not cure the real harms or the assault
on the dignity of lesbians and gay men perpetrated by the existence
of even the unenforced statute. This is because, quite simply,
"[u]nenforced sodomy laws are invective by government. '94
Not only has the State engaged in discriminatory prosecution of
the statute, but Justices of this Court (perhaps recognizing that the
statute as written constitutes a massive invasion of personal liberty)
have felt constrained to propose selective rewriting of the statute
as well. In 1975, for example, a defendant argued that the "crime
against nature" statute violated the right to privacy guaranteed to
married couples by Griswold v. Connecticut 95 . In denying a re-
hearing on that issue, Justice Tate noted the record of selective
prosecution and stated that "conduct between married couples is
not included within the scope of the statutory offense. ' 96 Justice
tion. See United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974) (statute or pros-
ecution unconstitutional where "government's discriminatory selection ... has been
invidious or in bad faith, i.e., based upon such impermissible considerations as race,
religion, or the desire to prevent [one's] exercise of constitutional rights.").
92. Pruitt, 449 So. 2d at 156 (case involving a male defendant who solicited a fe-
male police officer for oral sex for compensation).
93. Id.
94. MOHR, GAYS/JUSTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICS, SOCIETY AND LAW 123-24 (1988).
95. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
96. Lindsey, 310 So. 2d at 92 (Tate, J. concurring).
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Tate either was suggesting that, despite the plain meaning of the
statute, the oral or anal sexual acts that constitute "unnatural car-
nal copulation" when undertaken by unmarried people do not con-
stitute "unnatural carnal copulation" when undertaken by married
couples, or that the State's actual enforcement practices cured any
harm.97 Either way, Justice Tate's concurrence constituted an ac-
knowledgment that the "crime against nature" statute has become
something other than what it says it is.
Whether through selective enforcement or through selective, dis-
criminatory construction and invocation, the "crime against na-
ture" statute hangs as a veritable "Sword of Damocles" over the
heads of lesbians and gay men in Louisiana and elsewhere, and is
used as a powerful weapon to deny us our liberty, our equality, our
jobs, our children and our personal safety.98 As discussed above in
Points I (C) (2) and (3), R.S. 14:89 and its ilk brand us criminals for
expressing normal human intimacy and codifies into law a negative
attitude toward gay men and lesbians, communicating that attitude
to society and feeding prejudice, hatred, discrimination, and vio-
lence. Thus, with or without actual prosecution, the "crime against
nature" statute serves only to deny lesbians and gay men equal
protection of the laws, having become the means by which the
State and society treat us differently than our non-gay brothers and
sisters who are, by the express, if disregarded, terms of the statute,
similarly situated.
B. Such Selective Enforcement Reflects Illegitimate
Government Animus and Does Not Further Any
Appropriate State Interest.
A law which classifies individuals on a basis other than those
specifically listed in Article I, Section 3,99 "shall be rejected when-
ever a member of a disadvantaged class shows that it does not suit-
ably further any appropriate state interest."'" Because R.S. 14:89
97. Since the State of Louisiana to date denies lesbians and gay men our equal
right to marry the partner of our choice, this particular strand of selective enforce-
ment itself discriminates against lesbians and gay men.
98. As Justice Marshall once put it, the problem with "a sword of Damocles is that
it hangs-not that it drops." Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 231 (1974), reh'g de-
nied, 417 U.S. 977 (1974) (Marshall, J. dissenting).
99. The listed categories are: race, religion, birth, age, sex, culture, physical condi-
tion, or political ideas or affiliations. See supra note 85 for full text.
100. Sibley, 477 So. 2d at 1107-08. Under Sibley, if the state action classifies on the
basis of "culture" or "political ideas or affiliations," the burden of proof shifts to the
State to show a "reasonable basis" for the classification. Id. Because the classification
at issue here does not even "suitably further any appropriate state interest" under the
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does not "suitably further" any "appropriate" or rational state in-
terest, and, indeed, through its discriminatory effect, offends funda-
mental constitutional principles, it must fall.
The Kentucky Supreme Court, in striking down the Kentucky
"sodomy" statute on both privacy and equal protection grounds,
determined that there was no legitimate governmental interest jus-
tifying that statute's discrimination against lesbians and gay men:
The Commonwealth has tried hard to demonstrate a legitimate
governmental interest justifying a distinction, but has failed.
Many of the claimed justifications are simply outrageous: that
"homosexuals are more promiscuous than heterosexuals, ...
that homosexuals enjoy the company of children, and that
homosexuals are more prone to engage in sex acts in public."
The only proffered justification with superficial validity is that
"infectious diseases are more readily transmitted by anal sod-
omy than by other forms of sexual copulation." But this statute
is not limited to anal copulation, and this reasoning would apply
to male-female anal intercourse the same as it applies to male-
male intercourse. The growing number of females to whom
AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) has been
transmitted is stark evidence that AIDS is not only a male ho-
mosexual disease .... In the final analysis we can attribute no
legislative purpose to this statute except to single out homosexu-
als for different treatment for indulging in the same activity
heterosexuals are now at liberty to perform .... We need not
third prong of the Sibley analysis, this Court need not reach the issue of whether or
not the classification at issue triggers any heightened standard. However, should the
Court find that the statute, as selectively enforced and discriminatorily invoked, does
appropriately serve some legitimate state interest, it would have to consider whether
heightened scrutiny is warranted.
In that regard, the gay and lesbian community, particularly as it is responded to by
society, does exhibit many of the defining attributes of a "culture." See, e.g.,
D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A HOMOSEX-
UAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1970 (1983); E. KENNEDY AND M. DA-
VIS, BOOTS OF LEATHER, SLIPPERS OF GOLD: THE HISTORY OF A LESBIAN
COMMUNITY (1993); G. CHAUNCEY, THE POLICED: GAY MEN'S STRATEGIES OF EVE-
RYDAY RESISTANCE IN Inventing Times Square: Commerce and Culture at the Cross-
roads of the Worlds, 1880-1939 315-328 (W. Taylor ed. 1991); D. ALTMAN, THE
HOMOSEXUALIZATION OF AMERICA AND THE AMERICANIZATION OF THE HOMOSEX-
UAL (1982). Moreover, since increased "visibility" or open acknowledgement of sex-
ual orientation is a corner-stone of the struggle for equal rights for gay men and
lesbians, there are also inherently political dimensions to being openly gay or lesbian.
See Gay Law Students, 595 P.2d at 610 ("the struggle of the homosexual community
for equal rights ... must be recognized as a political activity"); see also, e.g., Gay
Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 33-37; Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 711-31 (9th
Cir. Wash. 1989)(en banc)(Norris, J. and Canby, J., concurring in the judgment), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990).
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sympathize, agree with, or even understand the sexual prefer-
ence of homosexuals in order to recognize their right to equal
treatment before the bar of criminal justice."° 1
This Court should similarly recognize that there is no legitimate
state interest in the effective reworking of the "crime against na-
ture" statute into a weapon against the lesbian and gay community
of Louisiana. The only possible purpose for this discriminatory se-
lective enforcement is to stigmatize gay men and lesbians, and to
effectuate, indeed promote, anti-gay prejudice. Such a goal is
never a permissible basis for governmental action. 0 2
Furthermore, the State has asserted no interest whatsoever for
regulating the intensely personal sexual behavior that R.S. 14:89
proscribes. In fact, in its zeal to deny Mr. Baxley standing to assert
his constitutional rights, the State has utterly failed to address the
central issue of this case: whether there is any appropriate reason
for the State of Louisiana to regulate the intrinsically personal sex-
ual choices of the citizens of Louisiana, let alone to do so in a dis-
criminatory fashion.
The State makes much of the alleged "commercial" aspects of
the facts of this case, arguing that Mr. Baxley "left his Article I, § 5,
freedom from "invasions of privacy" behind when he chose to
openly solicit a stranger on a public street for compensation.' 10 3
However, if the State's real interest in this case were the protection
of the public against the open solicitation of sexual acts for com-
pensation, then the logical crime to be charged was prostitution,
not "crime against nature."
Louisiana Revised Statutes includes a prostitution statute, R.S.
14:82, which clearly proscribes "the solicitation by one person of
another with the intent to engage in indiscriminate sexual inter-
course with the latter for compensation,"'" without sharing R.S.
14:89's discriminatory or invasive features. The prostitution statute
101. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 501.
102. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985);
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)("Private biases may be outside the reach
of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect."); Steffan v.
Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 68-69 (DC Cir. 1993) ("[A] cardinal principle of equal protection
law holds that the government cannot discriminate against a certain class in order to
give effect to the prejudice of others.... The Constitution does not allow government
to subordinate a class of persons simply because others do not like them.").
103. State's Brief at 15.
104. R.S. 14:82 provides:
A. Prostitution is:
(1) The practice by a person of indiscriminate sexual intercourse with others
for compensation.
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more precisely addresses the State's articulated concern, and will
continue to provide the State with sufficient means to pursue its
asserted goal of controlling the solicitation of any sex for compen-
sation, even once the "crime against nature" statute is declared
unconstitutional.
This Court should recognize, as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has, that regulating the private, non-commercial sexual conduct of
consenting adults "exceeds the valid bounds of the police power
while infringing the right to equal protection of the laws."'10 5 It
was, in part, the stigmatizing effect of selective enforcement of
Pennsylvania's "sodomy" statute 10 6 that led that court, in 1980, to
strike down the statute as violative of the equal protection guaran-
tee of the Pennsylvania Constitution (Pa. Const. Art. I, § 9).107 The
court stated:
With respect to regulation of morals, the police power should
properly be exercised to protect each individual's right to be
free from interference in defining and pursuing his own morality
but not to enforce a majority morality on persons whose con-
duct does not harm others. No harm to the secular interests of
the community is involved in atypical [sic] sex practice in private
between consenting adult partners. Many issues that are consid-
ered to be matters of morals are subject to debate, and no suffi-
cient state interest justifies legislation of norms simply because a
particular belief is followed by a number of people, or even a
majority. Indeed, what is considered to be "moral" changes
with the times and is dependent upon societal background.
Spiritual leadership, not the government, has the responsibility
for striving to improve the morality of individuals.'
To the extent the State has a legitimate interest in addressing
alleged commercial aspects of the conduct in Mr. Baxley's case, it
does not arise from the nature of the sex act proposed (the State
cannot seriously contend that commercial oral or anal sex is any
worse or gives rise to any greater state interest than any other form
of commercial sex). Nor does a legitimate state interest arise from
(2) The solicitation by one person of another with the intent to engage in
indiscriminate sexual intercourse with the latter for compensation.
105. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 50.
106. Pennsylvania's sodomy statute proscribed "voluntary deviate sexual inter-
course," defined as "sexual intercourse per os or per anus between human beings who
are not husband and wife, and any form of sexual intercourse with an animal." Act of
December 6, 1972, P.L.1482, No. 334, § 1, 18 PA.C.S.A. § 3101 (1973).
107. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47.
108. Id. at 50 (citing Model Penal Code § 207.5 - Sodomy & Related Offenses.
Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955))(emphasis added).
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the fact that Mr. Baxley is gay or approached a partner of the same
sex, nor from any proper role of the State in regulating autono-
mous sexual conduct or choice. Because the "crime against na-
ture" statute, unlike the prostitution law, rests on each of these
illegitimate State concerns, and because the statute's purpose and
effect is to stigmatize and harm gay people, it must fall. The State
will remain free to pursue any legitimate interests by other means,
and gay and non-gay people in Louisiana will no longer bear the
respective burdens of State intrusion into their personal relation-
ships and choices.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should strike down R.S. 14:89, "the crime against na-
ture" statute, as a violation of state constitutional guarantees of
privacy and equal protection.
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